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ABSTRACT 
SAME SITUATION, DIFFERENT TERMINUS:  
LESSONS REGARDING RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE 
AND SOUTH KOREA AND JAPAN FROM 1948 TO 1965  
 
Kim, Changsob 
 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Nil Şatana 
 
August 2008 
 
In 1948, Turkey-Greece and South Korea-Japan relations were in similar 
situations of a historical national animosity, perception of communist threat, and 
strategic interests of an alliance with the U.S. In 1965, whereas the North Eastern 
case came to a „more peaceful‟ convergence, the Mediterranean case reached „a 
conflictual type‟ of divergence. The aim of this thesis is to reveal the reason, 
comparing the two American solutions, which employed two theories, namely, 
institutionalism and economic interdependence: NATO in the Mediterranean case 
and bilateral trade in the North Eastern one. Through the use of theoretical and 
historical/empirical approach, this thesis highlights two findings: (1) in dyadic level 
of conflict, an economic solution was more successful than the NATO solution, and 
(2) the formation of direct bilateral relations was easier to eliminate historical 
enmity and establish peace than multilateral ones. I conclude that bilateral economic 
interdependence is far more effective in building peaceful relations between states 
compared to multilateral institutionalism. 
Keywords: Institutionalism, Multilateral Relation, Mediterranean, Turkey-Greece, 
Conflict, Economic Interdependence, Bilateral Relation, North Eastern Asia, South 
Korea-Japan, Peace 
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Ö ZET 
Aynı durum, farklı son: 1948’den 1965’e kadar Türkiye-Yunanistan  
ve Güney Kore- Japonya İlişkilerinden Çıkarılabilecek Dersler   
 
Kim, Changsob 
 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Nil Şatana 
 
Ağustos 2008 
 
1948 yılında, Türkiye-Yunanistan ve Güney Kore-Japonya ilişkileri, tarihsel 
bir ulusal düşmanlık, komünizmin tehdit algılaması, ve ABD ile stratejik muttefiklik 
ilişkileri açısından benzer konumda olmuştur. 1965 yılında, Uzakdoğu‟daki iki 
ülkenin durumu barışçıl bir konuma ulaşmışken, Akdeniz‟deki iki ülkenin ilişkileri 
karşılıklı uyuşmazlık sebebiyle gitgide gerginleşmiştir. Bu tezin amacı bu iki 
bölgedeki ülkelerin ilişkilerinin ne sebeple aynı konumdan farklı durumlara 
geldiğini kuramsal ve tarihsel bir analiz aracılığıyla ortaya çıkarmaktır. ABD bu iki 
bölgede önem verdiği devletler olan Turkiye-Yunanistan ve Güney Kore-Japonya 
ilişkilerini geliştirmek için kullandığı iki farklı stratejiyi “kurumcu” ve “karşılıklı 
ekonomik bağımlılık” okulları aracılığıyla incelemektedir. Akdeniz durum çalışması 
NATO‟nun, Uzakdoğu durum çalışması ise karşılıklı ticaretin uyuşmazlık 
üzerindeki etkisini araştırmaktadır. Bu çalışmalar aracılığıyla tezde iki husus 
vurgulanmaktadır. İlk olarak, uyuşmazlığı diyadik düzeyde önlemede, ticaret ve 
karşılıklı ekonomik bağımlılık, NATO‟nun bağlayıcılığından daha başarılı 
olmaktadır. İkinci olarak, iki taraflı ilişkilerin normalleşmesinde tarihi düşmanlıkları 
yok etmek ve barışı sağlamak için çok yanlı ilişkilerden faydalanılmalıdır.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kurumcu okul, yanlı ilişkiler, Akdeniz, Türkiye-Yunanistan, 
Uyuşmazlık, Ekonomik Karşılıklı Dayanışma kuramı, iki taraflı ilişkiler, Uzak Doğu, 
Güney Kore-Japonya, Barış 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
This thesis mainly argues that an analysis of the history of relations between 
Turkey-Greece and South Korea-Japan from 1948 to 1965 shows why the two North 
Eastern Asian countries developed peaceful relations and the two Mediterranean 
countries did not. There is a manifestation and yearning for peace and cooperation in 
bilateral relations respectively. In a speech by the Prime Minister of Greece, Kostas 
Karamanlis, who visited Turkey officially after almost half a century, a hope was 
expressed for bilateral relations that both countries could escape from a past marred 
by conflict and develop peaceful cooperation. The visit also highlighted that the 
resulting choices for the future should be based on economic relations, ie., the 
construction of a Turkish-Greek natural gas pipeline as part of the Turkey-Greece-
Italy (TGI) Corridor and a desire for Turkey‟s membership in the European Union 
(EU).
1
 On the other side, the new South Korean President Myungpark Lee's 
comments about the future of Korean-Japanese relationships were in a similar tone 
with Kostas Karamanlis‟ speech. Lee stated that the Republic of Korea (ROK) 
should form future-oriented relations with Japan in a practical manner; particularly, 
                                                 
1
 Kostas Karamanlis, “Greece and Turkey: Looking to the Future” (Speech at Bilkent University, 
Ankara, Turkey, January 24, 2008). 
 2 
 
he emphasized that ROK should forget the past and look to the future.
2
 In both cases 
the countries were eager to build peaceful relations with one another. 
However, generally speaking, the possibilities of peaceful relations still 
remain ambiguous in the Mediterranean region compared to North Eastern Asia. In 
the light of current events such as the S-300 Crisis and the Cyprus question, it seems 
that the relations between Turkey and Greece have been in a state of long-standing 
dispute, despite the bilateral efforts to normalize relations. Contrary to this, the 
relations between ROK and Japan have been progressing, as the number of official 
and unofficial visits between the Premier of Japan and the President of ROK have 
increased and militarized disputes or political crises have not taken place. What is 
more, the 2002 FIFA World Cup enabled ROK and Japan, the two hosts, to build 
much closer relations in political and economic terms. 
To find out why the two cases have produced different outcomes, the history 
of these countries between 1948 and 1965 needs to be analyzed. In both cases the 
countries arrived at different terminus in 1965 having started in similar situations in 
1948. In 1948, both cases had been suffering from three commonalities: a historical 
national animosity resulting from Japanese colonization of ROK and the domination 
of Greeks by the Ottoman Empire, external security threat from the Soviet Union 
and the strategic interests resulting from the alliance with the U.S. However, the 
results in both cases evidently diversified in 1965. American support for Turkey and 
Greece like their entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952 
had not made as considerable a contribution to the development of relations between 
the two countries as was expected. On the contrary, due to direct American 
intervention in relations between ROK and Japan, normalization in 1965 based on 
                                                 
2
 “Leedaetongryon mirae jiyang hanil gwangye jaekangjo (President Lee‟s re-emphasis on Future-
Oriented Korea-Japan Relations),” Donga Ilbo, Sec. Politics, March 1, 2008 (accessed on April 8, 
2008) http://www.donga.com/fbin/output?rss=1&n=200803010228. 
 3 
 
economic cooperation, which can be conceptualized as economic interdependence, 
played a decisive role in initiation of peaceful relations between the two North 
Eastern Asian countries. More specifically, the two North Eastern Asian countries 
increased economic cooperation despite problems related to poverty and sex slavery 
claims, thus developing their relations in every area year by year. However, even 
though the two Mediterranean countries, Turkey and Greece were members of 
NATO symbolizing political cooperation especially in security issues, they almost 
faced military confrontation in 1964.  
These phenomena cannot be transitional; however, unfortunately they have 
been glossed over by most academics, particularly when the two cases are compared 
using international relations theory. Therefore, the primary research aim of this 
thesis is to reveal the reason why the North Eastern case has come to a „more 
peaceful‟ convergence – more cooperative bilateral relations in economic terms - 
and the Mediterranean case has reached „a conflictual type‟ of divergence – less 
cooperative bilateral relations as regards to the Aegean Sea and the Cyprus questions. 
Of course, it seems certain that the current data substantiate more clearer statements 
that ROK-Japan relations are too close to be compatible with such economic terms 
as foreign direct investment (FDI)
3
, economic treaties and related agreements
4
, and 
the total trade-to-GDP ratio
5
, and that no extensive signs of progress of Turkey-
Greece relations seems to have taken place. Hence, it makes sense that current issues 
are more reasonable to explain with the two theories in tune with the two cases. 
However, this thesis avoids the occurrence of events with a few exceptions after 
                                                 
3
 Japan is a second source country, who provides Japanese foreign direct investment to South Korea, 
next to America. “Foreign Direct Investment,” 
http://www.fdimagazine.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/1029/South_Korea.html. 
4
 See appendix A.  
5
 In Statistics of bilateral trade, Japan is the second country next to US, occupying 19 percent of total 
trade. ROK occupies 6.9 percent of Japanese export and 4.6 percent of Japanese import. “The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,” http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/korea/fta/report0310-
14.pdf 
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1965 to date, mainly because it is necessary to highlight the underlying reasons and 
the starting point from which the above-mentioned results stemmed. Therefore, I 
examine whether a theory of economic interdependence is much more effective than 
political institutionalism in resolving regional disputes, by focusing on these two 
case studies, with particular attention to the critical years from 1948 to 1965.  
This thesis has an assumption to consider prior to operationalization of the 
variables. My assumption is that economic cooperation lessened negative historical 
memories, started to change Korean preferences and engendered peaceful bilateral 
relations that should be considered as economic interdependence. Doubtless, it is 
difficult to say whether economic interdependence would work well in North 
Eastern Asia during the 1950s and 1960s when trade shares were not the same for 
each country. Despite this limitation, the fact that economic cooperation has not 
been abandoned by the two states is testimony to the actual value and potential of 
the economic interdependence theory. It also cannot be denied that economic 
cooperation such as Japanese technological transfer and economic aid to ROK, made 
contributions to the opening of peaceful relations and the inception of economic 
interdependence. Normalization of relations under American pressure was achieved 
by economic need by which ROK‟s political leaders and most Japanese businessmen 
were expected to use the forthcoming opportunities.
6
 Despite negative feelings 
towards Japan from South Koreans stemming from past Japanese imperialism, 
Japanese investment gave rise to economic improvement of the ROK.
7
 Although not 
full-blown, these should be identified with economic interdependence.  
My core finding, which is derived from the comparative analysis of the North 
East Asian and the Mediterranean cases, is that international political institutions 
                                                 
6
 Chong-Sik Lee, Japan and Korea: the political dimension (Stanford California: Hoover institution 
press, 1985), pp. 43-67. 
7
 Ibid., pp. 62-66. 
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have a trivial effect on state interaction, and are less relevant to the stability of 
bilateral relations. Economic interdependence, instead, influences state behavior and 
thus leads to world peace, at least in the analysis of the Mediterranean and North 
Eastern Asian cases. As a result, this thesis also identifies the causal variables that 
drive peaceful bilateral relations. For that purpose, the independent variable is 
„economic interdependence supported by the US,‟ the dependent variable is 
„normalization of peaceful relations,‟ and, the control variable is „political and 
security cooperation through an institution like NATO.‟ The reason why the U.S. is 
included in the equation is that security and economic dynamics of the early Cold 
War depended considerably on American decision-making. Therefore, I also analyze 
how American foreign policies led to an easing of strained mutual relations in the 
two regions and how these policies were taken and responded to by both sides. 
This analysis is structured chronologically. The following five main chapters 
analyze the reasoning of the American Cold War solutions such as the NATO 
solution and economic interdependence solution to the two cases from historical 
aspects. The analysis of which of the two theories better explain follows the 
empirical findings.  
The first chapter starts with some historical commonalities of the countries 
discussed in the aftermath of the Second World War. Both cases at that time have 
some commonalities such as enmity and emotionalism resulting from legacies of the 
colonial and imperial eras; similar threat perception from the Soviet Union and the 
strategic interests of the alliance with the US.  
The second chapter will discuss the main theoretical approaches to the study 
of conflict. As mentioned earlier, the cases reach two different conclusions: while 
Turkey and Greece experienced militarized dispute, ROK and Japan followed a 
 6 
 
different path of peaceful normalization. To explain this anomaly of why the cases 
diverge, I will examine the theories of institutionalism and economic 
interdependence. In the first part, political institutionalism as an alternative 
argument will be explained by regime theory and its origin. The perspectives of 
realism, liberalism, and social constructivism will be compared. In the second part, 
economic interdependence as my explanatory argument will be compared in four 
ways: (1) Economic interdependence fosters peace, (2) Conditional economic 
interdependence promotes peace, (3) Economic interdependence leads to conflict, 
and (4) Economic interdependence is not related to conflict. By analyzing various 
strands emanating from the two theories, each perspective avoids theoretical bias.  
The third chapter focuses on American foreign policy in Turkey and Greece 
from 1948 to 1965, with a focus on Turkey. We will see from comparing the 
situation before and after joint NATO membership, how both states ironically turned 
to their regional issues, and whether the U.S./NATO involvement in the Turkish-
Greek relations positively affected peaceful relations between Turkey and Greece. 
The Turkish-Greek relations were not conflictual at first; in fact, relations looked 
quite promising. The Marshall Plan and Truman doctrine, joint NATO entry and co-
establishment of the Balkan Pact of 1954 indicated a way towards a peaceful and 
lasting solution against a potential Soviet threat. However, the year 1955 was a 
turning point of bilateral relations via the Cyprus dispute, which revealed that the 
sphere of influence of NATO on the nature of Turkey-Greece relations had been 
marginal. NATO‟s intentions aside, relations between Turkey and Greece evolved 
differently. After American President Johnson‟s harsh letter directed at Turkey, 
bilateral relations became strained, in fact the trilateral relations between the U.S., 
Turkey and Greece allowed Turkey and Greece to turn back to their own interests. 
 7 
 
NATO/U.S. could not restrain Taksim and Enosis policies from paving each state to 
their individual ways. 
The fourth chapter focuses on American foreign policy in ROK and Japan 
from 1948 to 1965, with a focus on ROK. We will see if the evolution of economic 
relations as an inception of bilateral economic interdependence positively influenced 
peaceful bilateral relations. In order to see this, I will compare ROK‟s three political 
leaders with normalization, and evaluate the mutual interests and Japanese support 
in 1961-65. The ROK-Japan relations had some difficulties in the beginning, given 
the Korean War, which reignited South Korean anti-sentiments towards the Japanese. 
However, the War was conducive to forming a U.S.-ROK-Japan triangle. Despite 
having some reservations, their economic interests were inextricably bound up with 
each other: the U.S. wanted to share its economic burden in the ROK, ROK wanted 
to be rehabilitated by American and Japanese support, and Japan expected new 
opportunities in a new market and cheap labor in the ROK. In the early 1960s, the 
decline of the American influence in Asia propelled both countries to form bilateral 
relations, leading to normalization based on economic structure. 
The final part of this thesis is devoted to the analysis of the effect of 
cooperation through political institutionalism versus economic interdependence 
regarding the two American experiments in the Mediterranean and the North East 
Asia. On one side, security needs were met by using the help of an institution, 
whereas on the other side the same needs were solved by using economic 
interdependence. The failure after success in the Mediterranean case shows that no 
matter how NATO forced Turkey and Greece to reach an agreement toward a modus 
vivendi, it could not become a long-term solution but just a temporary remedy. The 
success after failure in the North Eastern Asian case points out that there is little 
 8 
 
room for conflict between interdependent trading partners; therefore, it pays to use 
bilateral trade mutually in the world. Therefore, in dyadic level of conflict, bilateral 
economic cooperation is far more effective in finding a solution to disputes, than 
being compelled to use multilateral institutional efforts. 
Regarding the sources used, this thesis uses secondary research sources, such 
as academic journals and newspaper articles, and books; mainly in Korean, English 
and Turkish. The primary sources include some tables, which establish the 
relationship between economic interdependence and absence of conflict. With 
regard to the methodology I compare each empirical result with theories developed 
by academicians who are experts in their own fields.  
The main contributions of this thesis to the existing body of knowledge are as 
follows: First, this study aims to contribute to the theoretical and empirical literature 
through comparison of institutionalism versus economic interdependence 
approaches to conflict; as well as testing these approaches through the historical 
comparison of two cases. Second, this study tries to compare U.S.‟s attempts in two 
cases with two theories that pursued peace in a dimension of bilateral relations, thus 
showing the structure and nature of NATO or U.S.-Turkey-Greece and U.S.-ROK-
Japan triangle. Lastly and more importantly, this thesis aims to suggest a 
fundamental way for bilateral peaceful relations that may offer an applicable path 
for all states. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
HISTORICAL COMMONALITES OF RELATIONS BETWEEN 
TURKEY-GREECE AND KOREA-JAPAN 
 
 
 
This chapter explores three commonalities of both sides in the aftermath of 
the Second World War. First, both pair of states inherited a sense of animosity from 
the colonial and imperial eras. Second, in both cases the states experienced similar 
threat perception from the communist block and finally both cases included the 
strategic interests of states‟ alliance involving the U.S.  
 
2.1 The Mediterranean Case 
 
2.1.1 Historical Animosity  
Even though generations of their ancestors once lived in mixed communities 
harmoniously, without enmity or any serious problems, in general, Turkish-Greek 
relations were never warm since Greek independence from the Ottoman Empire in 
1832. A lengthy explanation of the historical animosity is not the purpose of this 
section; however, it is worth presenting the historical facts of the Turkish and Greek 
 10 
 
Wars of Independence, instead of discussing the enmity from a typical religious 
aspect such as Muslim Turks and Orthodox Greeks. 
With respect to Greek War of Independence, Greek separatism from the 
Ottoman Empire was affected by the Western theory of self-determination and the 
steady decline of the Ottoman-Turkish administrations by territorial expansion.
8
 
Mehmet Ali Pasha, the Sultan‟s governor in Egypt was charged with putting down 
the Greek resistance movement, which began in 1821 and his son Ibrahim Pasha 
defeated the Greeks, which led the European powers to intervene in Greece by using 
their naval power. The Egyptian-Ottoman fleet in the port of Navarino in September 
1827 was destroyed by the combined fleets of Britain, France and Russia.
9
 Finally, 
Greece became an independent country and was recognized by the Ottoman Empire 
in 1832.
10
 The Ottoman had conquered Athens in 1458 and had to give up the city 
374 years later; the Greeks restored sovereignty at the cost of many lives during the 
war (1821-1829). 
Regarding the Turkish War of Independence, the Greek invasion was one of 
the stumbling blocks for Turkish independence, striking a fatal blow to the newly 
rising Turkish Republic. The reasons why the invasion broke out were that the 
western Allies had promised Greece territorial gains if Greece supported the First 
World War on the Allied side, and Greece was eager to occupy Istanbul to achieve 
the Megali Idea
11
 (great idea) and were waiting for the right moment. On January 14, 
1919 the Greek army occupied part of eastern Thrace and local Greek civilians who 
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enlisted voluntarily in the Greek army joined the „ethnic cleansing,‟ destroying many 
mosques. The Greek First Division prepared for invasion of Izmir and was comprised 
of 13,000 soldiers, 4000 animals and 750 cannons. The soldiers landed and marched, 
shouting “long Live Venizelos, Long Live Greece, and Long Live Christostomos”; 
the Greeks began to advance into the interior of Anatolia under the pretext of 
“military necessity, requests of Greek villagers, Turkish threats to massacre Greeks, 
or the need to gain compensation for the Italian expansion in the East.”12 At the 
Treaty of Sevres, in August 1920, Greece gained Eastern Thrace and administered 
İzmir and the surrounding area; on 10 July 1921, the Greeks captured Eskişehir, 
Kütahya and Afyon, and advanced to Polatlı which was located to the west of 
Ankara.
13
 In due course, the invasion caused both sides to commit atrocities such as 
arson, robbery, and massacre. 
In short, through these two wars, the Greek War of Independence and the 
Turkish War of Independence, both countries had history of invading the other. 
“Echoes of these conflicts still roil the waters in Turkish-Greek relations,” leaving a 
historical enmity.
14
  
 
2.1.2 Threat Perception on Communism and the Soviet Union  
With the start of the Cold War after the end of the Second World War in 1945, 
the world lay under a bi-polar political system. The world was aligned into two parts: 
communist countries led by the Soviet Union and the Western Powers led by the 
United States. From a Western perspective, communism was a serious international 
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threat. This threat perception was an important factor in foreign policy decision-
making of states, which bordered communist states especially those that were 
contiguous with the Soviet Union; this was indeed the case for Turkey. Whereas 
Turkey perceived only an external threat, Greece faced both external and internal 
communist threats.  
For Greece, its government force vied with Greek communist guerilla and the 
civil war was the result of that internal threat. At the end of the Second World War, 
Communist guerilla groups such as the National Liberation Front (EAM) and its 
National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS) changed their structure. Civil wars in the 
first decade of the Cold War broke out through the well organized political and 
military coordination of EAM and ELAS, which aimed at increasing their 
determination to convert Greece into a “People‟s Democracy.” 15  This internal 
conflict was an additional burden on Greece apart from the external communist 
threat.  
As an external threat, Greece faced communist threats steming from 
Bulgarian and Yugoslav demands. Greek borders with Albania, Yugoslavia and 
Bulgaria originally attracted the exclusive attention of military planners of the time.
16
 
Notwithstanding, Greece had no direct threat from the Soviet Union, in essence, it 
was much the same, mainly because of the existence of Yugoslavia under the rule of 
Tito and satellite Bulgaria under the influence of Soviet Union. This all meant the 
potential of a communist attack from multiple enemies. What is more, both 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were connected with communist guerillas in Greece that 
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were fighting against the military. Accordingly, Greece had both internal and 
external threats, thereby in need of a western security umbrella. 
On the other hand, Turkey was on the front line of the Cold War 
confrontation and the leadership was seriously worried about the constant Soviet 
pressure. On 19 March 1945, the Soviets signified the need of amendment of the 
Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression of 1925, in the name of 
international developments, which requried Turkey to permit a Soviet base on the 
Straits and the areas of Kars and Ardahan in Eastern Turkey.
17
 Kars and Ardahan 
were ceded to Russia at the end of the Turco-Russian War of 1877 and in 1921 were 
returned to Turkey through the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship during the 
Turkish Independence War. Whereas the interests of Stalin in the region was to gain 
a foothold in the Mediterranean, Turkey represented legal rights by the Montreux 
Convention in 1936 in order to prevent Russia from taking initiatives on the Straits. 
After Molotov, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, denunciated the Turkish-Soviet 
treaty, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria put the squeeze on Turkey and the Turkish 
government.
18
 At the same time, Soviet troops in Bulgaria and the Caucasus 
increased the possibility of Soviet agression. Consequently, the Soviet demand for 
Turkey‟s territorial intergrity towards its Straits and northeastern borders uncovered 
the need of a Western-allied security guarantee. 
Interestingly, both states not only experienced similar threats, but also shared 
similar risks. If Russian expansionist designs succeeded in Greece, it is safe to say 
that Turkey would have fallen into the Soviet sphere of influence.
19
 Consequently, 
both states were in danger of becoming an easy prey to Moscow‟s wishes, which led 
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them to seek for an alliance in order to fulfill the requirements resulted by the threat 
perceptions from communism and the Soviet Union. 
 
2.1.3 Strategic Interests of the Alliance with the U.S. 
Both Turkey and Greece longed to have a security guarantee for their survival 
such as external military and economic aid due to above-mentioned threat perception. 
Both states recognized that they were insufficient politically, economically, and that 
they lacked the necessary military power to protect their territory and sovereignty. In 
the beginning of the Cold War, therefore, the main defense goal for both states was 
to be included in a Western security alliance, particularly aligned with the U.S.  
However, it was ambiguous during the first years of the Cold War whether 
American support was available to Turkey and Greece. Notwithstanding the U.S. 
acknowledged that these states contained geostrategic value in the Mediterranean and 
the Middle East, as a buffer system to Soviet influence, U.S. lingered over its 
decision of direct involvement and promise of permanent alliances. This was partly 
because Britain had been responsible for giving economic and military assistance to 
both states. Within these circumstances, in February 1947, Turkey and Greece, worse 
off than ever, were put under a situation where they could no longer be supported by 
British military and economic aid. Considering the „Future Policy towards Turkey 
and Greece‟ including strategic requirements in the area, British role for both 
countries of supporting methods, and the best way of inducting the Americans, in the 
end Britain gave up supporting the two countries reluctantly and unpredictably.
20
 
Britain had no alternative due to its economic difficulties such as the great fuel crisis 
in January 1947, whether this was the real reason or not, Soviet expansionist policy, 
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which seemed to be impending inevitably demanded an alteration of American 
policy.  
Fortunately, President Truman decided to shoulder the burden in place of 
Britain, although he did not take definite steps at the first stance due to its own 
expanded role as a world power.
21
 Communist-led revolts in Greece, as pointed out 
earlier, caused the U.S. to give priority to Greece; of course, the U.S. who had a fear 
of the spread of communism could not overlook Turkey. In this atmosphere, the 
Truman Doctrine left no question as to the appropriate response. According to the 
Truman Doctrine, Greece that was torn by a civil war was granted 300 million 
dollars and Turkey that had security value and passage role of the flow of oil to the 
West was granted 100 million dollars.
22
 On the one hand, the aid was a contribution 
to the development of the economy and military, on the other hand it had moral and 
political consequences. However, the aid was an ad hoc plan, and thereby both states 
were fervently pursuing a permanent American security umbrella. 
 
2.2 The North Eastern Asian Case 
 
2.2.1 Historical Animosity 
The nature of relations between Korea and Japan lays in that they are in close 
proximity to each other due to their location. History witnessed that both countries 
have had a similar culture and customs, which have made Korea-Japan relations 
more complicated. In the early phase, the Koreans who considered themselves “little 
China” and established close cultural ties with China, and the resulting relative 
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cultural superiority with Confucian and Buddhist factors were inherited by Japan.
23
 
However, the Japanese who absorbed the superior culture from Korea rejected their 
inferiority in terms of culture; thus they substituted cultural inferiority complex for 
military superiority, which led both countries to mutual contempt and derision.
24
 This 
tension came to a head during the Japanese occupation of Korean territory from 1910 
to 1945. Since Korean independence in 1945 in the aftermath of the end of the 
Second World War, ROK and Japan shared an abiding distrust and animosity.  
South Korean enmity was rooted in the era of Japanese colonization. In the 
beginning, during both the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and the Russo-Japanese 
War (1904-05), Japan began to interfere in the Korean government and intervened in 
Korean territory. After it won both wars, Japan as a final step annexed Korea on 
August 29, 1910 under the recognition of the United States and Great Britain who 
thought of Japan as a peace maker in the Far East.
25
 Despite the fact that Korea was 
declared independent by the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945 and ROK was 
inaugurated on August 15, 1948, it was not until 1951 that Japan recognized the 
ROK by making the Peace Treaty with ROK; thus, their relations could not be 
figured out “by traditional law on the restoration of peaceful relations.”26 Therefore it 
was difficult for Koreans to forget the bitter memories of Japanese domination and 
aggression, and Japanese also considered the Koreans as barbarian and ROK as “the 
most disliked country”.27 This bitter past spawned deep-seated antipathy and popular 
stereotypes, which made both countries introspective by which both peoples observe 
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and understand each other‟s behavior. These deeply rooted prejudices and mutual 
hatred found no termination.  
 
2.2.2 Threat Perception on Communism and the Soviet Union  
There were times when the postwar conflict of interests and ideologies 
between the Soviets was of one kind and the influence of United States was another, 
in the world as well as the Korean peninsula. The Soviet invasion of Manchuria and 
Korea on August 9, 1945 forced Japan to surrender on the following day, accepting 
the Potsdam Declaration; ironically this enabled the U.S. to rethink the influence of 
the Soviet Union, which would occupy the Korean peninsula.
28
 Wartime allies, the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union began to differ about several policies and the differences 
seemed irreconcilable. At a conference in Moscow in December 1945, a trusteeship 
plan was adopted by four powers, the U.S., Britain, China and the Soviet Union. This 
plan was in impasse, partly because Korean government wanted to be a unified state, 
and mainly because the U.S. brought the issue of Korean independence to the UN 
General Assembly in order to create an independent state based on the outcome of 
the general election while the Soviets rejected the proposal for the purpose of gaining 
northern Korea. Thus, according to the general election by southern Koreans, ROK‟s 
independence under the presidency of Syngman Rhee was announced to the world on 
August 15, 1948.
29
 In almost immediate response to this, above the 38
th
 parallel, the 
Korean People‟s Democratic Republic, as a puppet government of the Soviet Union, 
was established on August 25, 1948. 
Interestingly, ROK and Japan were not only under similar threats, but also 
shared the same risks. From the ROK‟s perspective, ROK played a decisive role in 
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defending Japan from the Communist threat and Japan at the start of the Cold War 
was the biggest beneficiary at the expense of a heavy security burden of South Korea, 
not least because if a war between North and South Korea occurred, it would not be a 
“fire on the other side of the river.” According to the Japanese perspective, Japan 
feared that if communist North Korea cooperated with the Soviet Union and China, it 
would reunify the country by force.
30 
Consequently, the fact that ROK would be in 
danger of becoming Moscow‟s satellite put ROK-Japanese relations under a similar 
threat.  
 
2.2.3 Strategic Interests of the Alliance with the U.S. 
In the meantime, American interests on the divided Korea were not at stake. 
With the political unrest of South Korea as a newborn state, ROK had no military 
equipment capable of wedging a defensive war against communist expansion, 
lacking even a single tank or a fighter plane. More seriously than that, armed 
rebellion supported by the North Korean Communists who had aims of subverting 
the ROK occurred at Yosu and Sunch‟on located in southwestern South Korea in 
1948, in the shape of an internal war led by Communists, which was similar to what 
happened in Greece. Ironically, at this conjuncture, ROK lay outside the U.S. defense 
boundary.
31
 
The request of ROK, which had been eager to get a Western-allied security 
guarantee, was turned down. Even though Syngman Rhee attempted to form a 
military alliance with the U.S., American military forces in South Korea were 
withdrawn in June 1949, except for the 500-man Military Advisory Group in Korea 
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(KMAG), leaving ROK “vulnerable to a possible attack” from the Communists.32 To 
make matters worse, the Acheson Line on 12 January 1950 was declared with the 
exclusion of Korea and inclusion of Japan, which allowed South Korea to have no 
security alliances like NATO. The fact that the United States would not guarantee aid 
to ROK against a Communist military attack meant “the invitation to the 
Communists to attack Korea.”33 Therefore, it became evident that in the mind of the 
U.S. was no realization that the ROK faced a serious crisis, perhaps as great a crisis 
as it had ever faced.  
As mentioned above, the Japanese considered the ROK as the last bulwark for 
its security. In the view of Japanese political leaders, South Korea was not a minor 
spot that could probably be safely ignored. Japan had two kinds of fear: (1) the Japan 
Communist Party sometimes co-worked with the Chinese, and (2) overwhelming 
Soviet power had demanded southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles since the Second 
World War.
34
 Accordingly, it could be said that Japan and ROK who had symbiotic 
relations perceived a similar threat from the Communists and thereby both wanted 
passionately a permanent American security guarantee. 
Despite these three common factors that affected the relations between the 
two states in the Mediterranean and the North Eastern Asian cases, in the political 
climate of the year 1965 they reached two different conclusions: respectively, 
militarized dispute and peaceful normalization of relations. The next chapter 
examines the theoretical literature on conflict to explain the reasons for the different 
paths the cases followed, despite these three important commonalities. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
3.1. Political Institutionalism 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the main objective of this chapter is to 
review the two theoretical approaches regarding political institutionalism. Regime 
theory provides a suitable basis for this analysis. Regimes, according to the definition 
of Krasner, are “institutions possessing principles, norms, decision rules, and 
decision-making procedures which facilitate a convergence of expectations.” 35 
Kegley and Wittkopf also define regimes as “institutionalized or regularized patterns 
of cooperation in a given issue-area, which is reflected by the rules that make a 
pattern predictable.”36 These rules are “negotiated by states and entail the mutual 
acceptance of higher norms, which are standards of behavior defined in terms of 
rights and obligations.” 37  Therefore, regimes enable member states to alleviate 
security dilemma stemming from respectively different threat perceptions.  
In reality, as illustrated in the classical “prisoners‟ dilemma” game, 
cooperation usually does not often happen in an anarchical international system 
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because players do not trust one another and hardly communicate with each other. 
By modifying the prisoners‟ dilemma game, Robert Axelrod, writer of “The 
Evolution of Cooperation,” argues that cooperation is possible under certain 
circumstances.
38
 Even though, in normal circumstances, people do not cooperate 
with each other, on the basis of „multiple play or iterations‟, players can recognize 
the advantages of cooperation if the game is played more than once. What is more, if 
communication is possible between the players, the prisoners‟ dilemma game may 
prove to be improper. There is also „the shadow of the future‟ meaning that there is a 
possibility for an event to happen again. In addition, because mutual interest exists 
between states, international relations are not a game of pure conflict or pure 
cooperation. That is, players will share both the spoils and the benefits. For that 
reason, Axelrod, by using strategies „available in multiple iteration games‟ argues 
that international regimes encourage a „Tit-for-Tat‟ strategy, which includes the first 
step as cooperation, giving the „benefit of the doubt‟ to the opponent and the next 
step is to „do whatever the other side does‟ similar to „eye for an eye‟. What matters 
for success in this strategy is “its combination of being nice, retaliatory, forgiving, 
and clear”39; in other words, equivalent retaliation.  
In this sense, regimes provide ways of increasing cooperation by giving 
valuable information at low cost and reducing the costs of bargaining among 
members.
40
 In addition to these ways, there are ways to improve mutual cooperation: 
lengthening the shadow of the future, altering the payoffs of the game, 
institutionalization of rules for cooperation and defection, facilitating issue linkage
41
, 
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and, redirecting domestic hostility. Although it is obvious that the regime would 
facilitate an agreement among states by increasing trust and by decreasing 
misunderstood intentions, it still remains uncertain whether increasing political 
cooperation renders peace or conflict. Therefore, clear analysis, in the first stance, 
should be a priority for better theoretical understanding of the institution to argue 
whether political institutions lead to peace or conflict. 
The origin of political institutionalism dates back to the early twentieth 
century when Woodrow Wilson, an idealist who developed the concept of collective 
security as a basis for the League of Nations, an example of a political institution that 
signifies a brilliant promising manifestation for enhancing international peace and 
removing the fear of war. As idealism‟s popularity increased, the expectations 
exceeded reality. Ironically, since the end of the Cold War, there has been much hope 
and interest in collective security organizations.
42 
Despite some shortcomings, the 
Wilsonians clearly succeeded in establishing the conviction that collective security 
considerably represented a possibility and the value of international peace and 
cooperation rather than balance of power in the anarchical international system. 
As seen in Table 1 below, the two representative perspectives on political 
institutionalism differ as to the peace-causing effects of international institutions. 
Realists favor the idea that institutions lead to conflict and acknowledge that the 
causes of war and peace are a role of the balance of power rather than presence or 
absence of institutions. Countries operate through institutions, which conditionally 
work under common interests. What is more, realists argue that their rules and norms 
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echo the self-interest of states, which is a result of the international distribution of 
power.
43 
Therefore, states can cooperate in part, but peace is unlikely. In contrast, 
according to liberals, political institutionalists who propose that institutions lead to 
peace and recognize that their informational roles can provide international actors 
with a reduction of transaction costs, enforcement of credible commitments and 
generally maximized benefits of reciprocity.
44
 For those reasons, in the end 
institutions would make the world more peaceful. Parallel to representative division, 
recent research underlines a notion that institutionalism should be examined in three 
strands such as realism, liberalism, and social constructivism.  
 
Table 1: Comparison of Realists and Liberals on Institutionalism 
 
 Institutionalism and Realists Institutionalism and Liberals 
Leading Logic Balance of power Collective security 
Independent 
Variables 
Common interests Institutions 
The Solution 
about Cheating 
and Gains 
Distribution of power Distribution of information 
Results 
Possible cooperation but  
peace is unlikely 
Possible cooperation and  
peace is likely 
 
3.1.1. Institutionalism and the Realists 
Realists mainly differ in four aspects of their propositions on institutionalism 
in comparison to the liberals. Firstly, realists consider balance of power as the 
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leading logic. In international politics, according to realists, security is the most 
important goal for states and economy is important as long as a state increases its 
power. For instance, according to realists international institutions are a false promise 
and institutions are established out of necessity and they are not always valuable
45
. 
More importantly, the balance of power is being played in everyday politics of the 
United Nation (U.N.), NATO and every other institution. For that reason, 
cooperation under the concept of balance of power takes place in the form of 
alliances to protect common interests. States pursue both offensive and defensive 
ways, by balancing themselves against larger and more powerful actors or by 
bandwagoning them; sometimes, they let two or more rivals start a proxy war.
46
 
Balancing among states automatically takes place, not for the purpose of maintaining 
peace. Under the balance of power theory, states directly affect other actors as 
independent and self-helping actors.  
Secondly, to a large extent, similar to the first argument, the institutions just 
act as intervening variables. Institutions are nothing but intervening variables in 
understanding why institutions are created and how they exert their effects. Although 
institutions change such patterns of state behavior there is the incentive for states to 
cheat and blindly accept benefit-cost analyses, the resulting alteration cannot give 
birth to a change in the fundamental goals of states. This limitation comes to surface, 
considering that the main roles of institutions are to permit reciprocity to cooperate 
powerfully by providing information about others‟ hidden stakes and tendency of 
behavior.
47
 This reciprocity in the same line as “Tit-for-Tat” strategy can bring the 
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world to a mutually worse situation, and thus can be considered equivalent retaliation. 
For example, if both actors in the pursuit of specific reciprocity move in a malign 
direction, then cooperation and peace cannot be reached so long as both adhere to 
this strategy.
48
 Like this, institutions cannot make light of underlying states‟ interest; 
instead, they are employed as tools to change states‟ strategies in some manner that 
egoistic states are willing to cooperate with each other.
49
 Therefore, countries operate 
through institutions which conditionally work under common interests. 
Thirdly, the threat of cheating and reliance on benefit-cost analysis as the 
central impediment to cooperation can be solved through distribution of power. 
Institutions worry about the potential for others to cheat, as in the Prisoners‟ 
Dilemma game. States have two faces in terms of relative-gains consideration and 
the cheating problem, which lead to pessimistic prospects for mutual cooperation. 
For that reason, realists portray an unenthusiastic evaluation of a possibility for 
international cooperation and of the abilities of institutions.
50
 A state may fear what 
is behind the other; in other words, states can never be certain about the intentions of 
other states. Consequently, uncertainty is unavoidable when assessing intentions, 
which simply means that states can never be sure whether or not other states have 
offensive intentions.
51
 Therefore, the distribution of information cannot explain 
entirely how states overcome their fears and learn to trust one another. International 
institutions may not always reduce uncertainty/transaction costs, and therefore 
strengthen cooperation. 
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Consequently and fourthly, according to realists institutions make 
cooperation possible but not peace. They are useful only when great powers have 
benefits to dominate in the world and achieve their goals through institutions like the 
UN Security Council, emphasizing the relative gains as the obstacle to cooperation. 
That is, realists argue that institutions are fundamentally tools for putting into 
practice the self-interested calculations of the great powers, and they believe that 
institutions are not an important factor for peace; therefore, they matter only on the 
margins, regardless of peace.
52 
Similar to the action of the United States, even the 
Soviet Union joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 
and so forth. Powerful states form institutions to improve their own interests, thus 
forcing weaker states to obey them. For instance, despite the end of the Cold War, 
the survival and expansion of NATO show us the extent of American power and 
exemplify how institutions are constructed and maintained by super-powers‟ self-
interest, whether intentional or not.
53
 New members of NATO substitute their old-
fashioned military infrastructures with the American arms industry systems because 
of an American lobby in favor of NATO‟s expansion.54 As a result, institutions not 
only act as spokesmen for national interests but also are unwilling to restrain 
powerful states;
55
 in the end, they can lead to intermittent cooperation at most.  
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3.1.2. Institutionalism and the Liberals 
Liberalism mainly differs in four of its propositions in comparison with 
realism. Firstly, liberals consider international institutions as the leading logic of 
their theoretical framework. The balance of power considerations are, in Arnold 
Wolfers‟s words, an “ambiguous symbol” and an unequivocal concept which should 
be scrutinized carefully.
56
 Even though, realists argue that states would not cede to 
institutions, not least because they tend to pursue their power and thus affect their 
interactions without external help, liberal institutionalists support the opposite view. 
In a similar vein, they mention that institutions can change a state‟s tendency, thus 
influence a state‟s decision making. Therefore, institutions play a decisive role in 
shaping a state‟s intention, instead of balance of power. 
Secondly, similar to the first argument, institutions directly contribute to the 
change of state preferences as independent variables. Liberal institutionalist theory 
defines institutions as independent and dependent variables, mainly because 
“institutions change as a result of human action, and the changes in expectations and 
process that result can exert profound effects on a state‟s behavior”; furthermore, 
states create institutions and in turn, institutions have an impact on patterns of their 
behavior.
57
 However, institutions of liberals are an independent variable, which are 
not only willing to let the cat out of the bag by disclosing how states will respond to 
conditions of anarchy, but also are capable of avoiding war. What is more, 
institutions alter the motivation for states to cheat; they also lessen “transaction costs, 
link issues, and provide focal points for cooperation.” 58  As seen, institutions 
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emphasize that their functions are to change behavior and agree to cooperation, 
which would be the only option and otherwise almost certainly be unsuccessful.
59
 
Therefore, institutions affect actors‟ behavior, interest, and intention as independent 
variables.  
Thirdly, the threat of cheating and reliance on benefit-cost analysis can be 
eliminated through the distribution of information. Institutions, despite their value, 
find achievement difficult, mainly because of the fear that the other is breaching or 
will breach the common norms and agreements, which according to Jervis are “a 
potent incentive for each state to strike out on its own even if it would prefer the 
regime to prosper.” 60  However, institutions can alleviate fears of cheating and 
thereby allow cooperation to emerge by providing valuable information. Such as the 
distribution of gains, in this case, if the potential absolute gains from cooperation are 
sizeable, it seems to be that relative gains are unlikely to be essential to 
cooperation.
61
 Creating issue linkages, raising the costs of violations, and providing 
information about military expenditure and capacity among and between states can 
make a contribution to the enhancement of cooperation.
62
 What is more, if “Tit-for-
Tat” strategy is to be successful then institutions must keep to the practice of sharing 
information on the condition that reciprocity will enable this world to be a more 
peaceful place. 
Consequently and fourthly, institutions can achieve both cooperation and 
peace. Liberals believe that institutions would lengthen the shadow of the future in 
the world, thus achieving cooperation and peace. Keohane puts emphasis on the 
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positive aspect of cooperation, and says that cooperation is possible even in the 
absence of hegemony, because ways to improve mutual cooperation through 
institutions are superior to non-institutional functions.
63
 Therefore, adherence to 
institutional cooperation will increase the level of transparency and confidence, 
thereby making the world peaceful. 
 
3.1.3. Institutionalism and Social Constructivism 
Sociological-institutionalists go one step further in proclaiming that the 
identities and interests of actors are socially constructed and even more, institutional 
relationships contain other ideational factors radiating from people as cultural 
beings.
64
 All kinds of institutional relationships are social constructions, which 
undergo a process of evolution in the social world. Thus, social and material realities 
in the domestic and international structures affect actors‟ behavior and common 
identities. Through the distribution of knowledge, institutions can make international 
actors share a common identity. Challenging two dominant international relations 
theories such as realism and liberalism, constructivism argues that the ideational 
motivation to justify national identity allows states to follow international norms, 
rules, and commitments.
65 
In a similar vein, it is possible to change the anarchic 
nature of the system of states based on rationality, and also institutional cooperation 
at the highest level can work well.  
From the perspective of social constructivism, NATO can be regarded as a 
security community. In Table 2, Muller reveals the tangible indicators of the security 
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community, which is rather self-explanatory. According to his table, (1) a common 
identity and mutual trust in member countries will bind with the transatlantic “we-
feeling,” (2) war is unthinkable due to the members‟ renouncing of the thought of 
violent conflict against each other, and (3) NATO, as the best equipped military 
alliance, keeps the highest level of military integration, particularly fully integrated 
military staff, air defense, and allied corps.
66
 Therefore, the members should 
converge on a point where their national identities and interests are one, on the basis 
of their ideational norms.  
Table 2: The Atlantic Alliance as Security Community
67
 
 
Ideational 
Normative 
Ideational 
Utilitarian 
Institutional/ 
Practice 
Signifiers 
Community of 
values 
Joint threat 
perception 
(Informal) 
governance 
War (preparation) 
unthinkable 
No notion of 
mutual war 
Liberal democracy 
Market economy 
Communism Soviet 
Union 
NATO organization  
We-feeling/identity 
“The free West” 
“The Atlantic 
community” 
Material benefit 
perception Security 
Economic welfare 
Strong core US/Great 
Britain/ Germany 
Mil Integration 
Fully integrated 
military staff, Air 
defense, Allied 
Corps 
Responsiveness 
Consultation norm 
Multiple 
transactions 
Military 
Deployments, Trade 
and Investment 
Cultural/scientific 
exchanges 
Transnat. community 
Core transatl. sec. 
establishment; 
transatl. business 
associations 
 
Mutual trust Basic 
belief in allies‟ 
reliability 
 
Coop./collective 
security Mutual aid 
promise in case of 
attack 
 
  
Coordination against 
internal threat 
Propaganda war 
against communism 
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On balance, realists argue that institutional outcomes reflect great power, thus, 
institutions are basically tools of great powers. They are much less successful in 
handling conflict. On the contrary, liberals assert that there is no mechanism other 
than institutions for carrying out cooperation and peace. In the same line, the promise 
of NATO in the resolution of conflicts between Turkey and Greece would gradually 
be realized, eliminating suspicious feelings. Both states as NATO members would 
cooperate more easily, and thus develop a confident climate in their region. From the 
perspective of social constructivism, their ability to distribution of knowledge makes 
institutions effectively help international actors share a common identity. Therefore, 
NATO‟s role in the formation of a strong security community identity would foster 
trust between Turkey and Greece, thus preventing them from viewing each other as 
threats, consequently war would turn out to be unrealistic and unthinkable. When 
taken together, the following sections of the thesis will analyze these theoretical 
expectations, employing empirical approach. 
 
3.2. The Argument: Economic Interdependence Theory  
In its widest sense, the people of the world have become interdependent in 
terms of economic relations. Interstate trade in all geographical boundaries have not 
limited their influence on themselves and other territories, each absolute character in 
political terms cannot guarantee inherent political independence or isolation, and 
local events or decision-making can have a worldwide effect. In this sense, 
globalization is not an „event,‟ but a gradual process with transnational and inter-
regional patterns, far from simple interdependence, which in the twenty first century 
is eroding statehood, the elite‟s role, and the notions of sovereignty, leading to the 
weakening of the realist view over time; in addition, theorists also generally focus on 
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economic factors based on low politics rather than security implications centering on 
high politics.
68
 This view stems from the systemic structure of the world: a system 
affects actors in the system and actors affect a system in which they all interact with 
each other, and thereby the way that they interact might actually affect the whole.
69
 
That is, the fate of every actor in the system shares its fortune with one another. 
In the field of international relations, economic interdependence has two 
implications: firstly, economic conditions of interdependent countries are contingent 
on those found in the others, for instance, inflation in France affects prices in 
Germany; secondly, interdependent countries recognize that it would be costly for 
them to give up their relationship, just as relations between the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the advanced industrial countries, which 
rely heavily on petroleum imports, cannot be abandoned.
70
 The hypothesis of the 
complex interdependence theory is that bilateral interdependence is more likely to 
increase economic cooperation, which is more likely to decrease military conflict. As 
a result, bilateral interdependence is more likely to decrease militarized conflict. 
Another hypothesis is that systemic interdependence like the amount of trade 
between all great powers is more likely to increase economic cooperation and 
thereby to decrease the probability of militarized conflict.  
Until 1980 it was believed that all trade came from comparative benefits, 
utilizing the edge of fundamental differences between each state.
71
 However, we 
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should follow this line of thought with a question: how does economic 
interdependence relate to absence of war? Seeking for an answer, it is worth pointing 
out the viewpoints of realism and liberalism with respect to economic 
interdependence. Firstly, liberals underline that the mutual benefits from trade 
between and among states generate strong incentives for peace and put emphasis on 
how individuals or governments react to take full advantage of the benefits of 
economic interdependence. On the contrary, realists lay emphasis on the lack of 
interdependence such as asymmetrical economic relationships and friction happening 
between actors, which cause more conflict making this relationship insignificant. By 
the same token, the effects of economic interdependence can be identified in two 
ways: (1) its positive impacts are so important that at best economic interdependence 
must prevail at all costs, and (2) in contrast, the negative impact is that it invokes the 
worst distortion and domination.
72
 Yet, this simple dissection with regard to liberal 
and realist formulation may be insufficient for understanding the above- mentioned 
question
73
  
Apart from the classical division, recent research underlines the relationship 
between economic interdependence and conflict should be dealt with in four strands. 
Parallel to that, Katherine Barbieri formulated Figure 1, a dyadic relationship, 
suggesting that it is necessary to investigate “the nature and context of economic 
linkages” between two states.74  
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Figure 1 is useful in identifying how the conditions, benefits and costs of 
trade interact with conflict, and illustrate three mutual relationships such as 
interdependence, dependence, and independence: (1) in Figure 1 where “each axis 
measures the trade share each state has of its partner‟s total trade,” Quadrants I and 
IV imply that a country is unequally dependent upon the other partner country, which 
usually leads to conflict. (2) Quadrants III shows symmetrical dependence under 
minimal level, which is at the edge of economic relations. (3) Quadrants II hint at 
extensive and balanced dependence, which would provide the greatest possibilities 
for peace.
75
 
 
Figure 1. Dependence and Interdependence Continuum
76
 
 
3.2.1 Economic Interdependence Fosters Peace 
Supporters who are in favor of economic interdependence because it fosters 
peace are similar to the subscribers of utopian and idealistic parts of liberalism. 
Expansion of trade over time regardless of the nature and context of economic 
linkages contributes to the development of a peaceful world. Keohane and Nye 
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explain why states cooperate and point out that “the benefits of economic 
interdependence acted as a major incentive, resulting in greater predictability and 
regularity between states and creating procedures, rules, and institutions for 
governing state relations.”77 According to Polachek, the existence of comparative 
advantage through trade enables states to avoid conflict with a trading partner, 
mainly because of the danger of loss of their own welfare.
78
 Mutual dependence 
makes peace easier and hence increases the incentives toward cooperation, which 
rests on dyadic trade patterns.
79
 In this sense, interdependence stimulates self-control 
in the use of violence and accelerates the pace of negotiation and cooperation. 
Therefore, even though there are some threats associated with serious security 
challenges and uncertainties, economic interdependence can become the vehicle to 
generate greater trust and confidence between states.  
Richard Rosecrance points out that a liberal and open economy is required to 
augment trade, depending on the cost-benefit analysis; in other words, trade becomes 
a more efficient tool while war becomes a relatively expensive way of reaching one‟s 
goal.
80
 The economic web can serve as building blocks in improving further bilateral 
relations. For example, in spite of their historic animosities and reservations, the East 
Asian countries under the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASESAN) enjoy 
economic growth and cooperation, at the same time expanding economic 
opportunities.
81
 Interstate linkages are believed to increase communication, decrease 
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misunderstanding, and stimulate the recognition of mutual benefits, thus leading to 
more a peaceful dyadic relationship. 
In quantitative studies, the fact that bilateral trade reduces the likelihood of 
militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) is supported to a large extent. MIDs mean “a 
set of interactions between or among states involving threats to use military force, 
displays of military force, or actual uses of military force” and the three factors must 
be unequivocal, which would stem from responsible state authorities.
82
 Gartzke & Li 
in „Measure for Measure‟ evaluate three indicators; trade dependence, openness, and 
trade share: (1) high trade dependence meaning the lower bilateral trade-to-GDP 
ratio decreases the probability of violent interstate conflict; (2) despite the negative 
correlation with onset of MIDs, monadic trade openness measured by the total trade-
to-GDP ratio also is an overarching factor for peace; and (3) trade share meaning the 
ratio of bilateral to total trade lessens the likelihood of the onset of MIDs, not the 
least because it is likely to indicate a country‟s lack of integration into the world 
economy and even more represents the dependency in trading relations.
83
 In response, 
John R. O‟Neal emphasizes a one standard-deviation increase more than the bilateral 
trade-to-GDP measure in trade dependence and puts relative weight on openness, and 
uses Gleditsch‟s argument84; Gleditsch suggests that lower bilateral trade-to-GDP 
ratio is meaningful only if the best available trade data is employed and the resulting 
openness became an important measure. He emphasizes the probability of problems 
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arising from using inefficient sources of economic data.
85
 As seen, even though the 
indicators have drawbacks and debates regarding the effect of trade on bilateral 
conflict are still underway, the literature suggests that economic interdependence 
measured by trade dependence decreases the likelihood of interstate conflict. A more 
specific set of hypotheses will be discussed below to show differences in each 
argument.   
 
3.2.2 Conditional Economic Interdependence Promotes Peace 
Despite these advantages, economic interdependence for the benefits of 
international economic relations contains a main problem: it requires sacrificing a 
certain amount of national independence relevant to sovereignty. The more a state 
decides to get involved in international economic cooperation, the greater the degree 
of economic exposure and pressure it faces. In practice, each nation‟s sovereignty in 
international economic arena can be menaced by two factors; the first is the 
possibility of imbalances with respect to economic dependence. Secondly, this 
possibility rests on the ability of each state to regulate and impose taxes on the other 
state.
86
  
Due to these two factors, although independent national decision-making is 
still present, “the political consequences could no longer be controlled 
autonomously”87; thus the economic partner would go far beyond proper infiltration 
in the policy-making process. Likewise, even though economic interdependence 
resting on liberalism is useful for peaceful relations, its effects are not always 
promising; thus, interdependence makes a contribution to the reduction of conflict, 
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but it is not a guarantee to cede all conflict.
88
 Trade is worth pursuing only when the 
benefits from mutual trade outweigh the costs related to economic dependence. As 
for a weaker country, trade with more powerful states often leads to a fall in net costs 
rather than an increase in mutual net benefits. These arguments by dependency 
theorists are not new: trading benefits are the possession of developed states and the 
resulting trading relation delays the development of the developing state; trade 
intensifies the differences of wealth; and in the end, trade drives weaker countries 
into a position of dependence.
89
 Therefore, it can work in practice on the basis of a 
condition that economic interdependence should lie under symmetrical trade 
relations.  
 
3.2.3 Economic Interdependence Leads to Conflict 
Supporters of economic interdependence regard the claim that economic 
interdependence makes the world more peaceful as a fallacy. Economic 
interdependence cannot draw blue prints for a peaceful world, simply because it 
would not be realized in the foreseeable future. Misplaced reliance on solutions 
through economic interdependence is likely to lead to more failures. In the same vein, 
Ramsay Muir summarized three disadvantages of interdependence: (1) the peril of 
war escalates in normal life throughout the world, considering that an interdependent 
world encourages struggles for livelihood with resources drawn from everywhere, (2) 
the expansion of the concept of sovereignty in line with the principles of self-
determination has difficulty in limiting „self-help‟, which would result in disturbing 
the whole system, (3) economic nature of “tariff restrictions and the danger of 
monetary collapse” meaning that every state makes an effort to increase revenue by 
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imposing tariffs on other countries and monetary stability seems to be unfeasible 
when creditors force the debtor country to import.
90
 As mentioned above, 
interdependence requires sacrifice of the countries involved, mainly because it puts a 
ceiling on autonomy. That the differences of trade balances between two countries 
are high and the states‟ ability to regulate them is weak indicate that the bilateral 
relationship is asymmetric. But for some regulations of these asymmetric perils, 
economic interdependence makes conflict more ineluctable, and it leads to greater 
harm.  
Imperialism is one way of economic dependence in history, which illustrates 
how military force affects inequitable economic relationships. That is, imperialism 
changes its strategy, for instance from military occupation to trade monopoly. This 
way comes to the surface as a by-product of protectionism and economic 
nationalism; thus, the protected industries can compel weaker countries to buy, 
through imposing an agreement even if the state is unwilling and thereby, 
protectionism moves the world to imperialistic conflicts.
91
 Robert Gilpin argues that 
interdependence leads to insecurity; according to economic nationalists, hegemons in 
decline are not able to diminish the domestic economic vulnerability, which makes 
them more prone to conflict.
92
 
Neither Nationalism, Marxism, nor neo-realist schools of thought identify, 
legitimize or uphold the idea of interdependence. People and political leaders 
acknowledge what can and what cannot be achieved by use of military means, and 
are more interested in using economic tools. If interdependence is connected with 
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„power‟, the type of economic relations remains uncertain; even more, it can be 
considered as vehicles carrying out power among actors.
93
 Therefore, 
interdependence implies that even though concerns of conflicts are outmoded, 
international conflict still exists when interdependence wins through; what is more, it 
may even escalate.
94
 
In quantitative studies, there is evidence of the contradictory effect of trade 
interdependence on dyadic military disputes. To explain the trade-conflict 
relationship, Barbieri employs two measures of dyadic interdependence such as the 
salience-“the importance or size of the trading relationship” and the symmetry of 
dependence-“the equality of dependence between partners” and the share of trade 
meaning “the proportion of dyadic trade over total trade, both import and export 
flows” as the indicators.95 Evolving general expectations that asymmetric dependence 
between developed and developing states -even under greater degrees of salience- 
may cause conflict “due to the unequal distribution of perceived benefits,” and 
salient, symmetric trade may lead to peace between trading partners, Barbieri brings 
to light some remarkable findings: (1) symmetry for peaceful dyadic relation only 
makes a premise of lower levels of salience, (2) salient trade dependence, with even 
equal dyads, encourages conflict, (3) despite negotiation-oriented settlements, 
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 Dyadic Tradeij 
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(3) As for Symmetry, little difference of mutual trade share means greater parity of dependence. 
Symmetryij = 1– |Trade Sharei – Trade Sharej| 
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disturbed conflicts tend to build up a war.
96
 More importantly, Figure 2 below shows 
that „extensive‟ economic interdependence amplifies the possibility of waging a war; 
that is, interdependence has little effect on conflict at the low levels of trade share but 
the more dyads come to be dependent, the probability of conflict increases.
97
 As seen, 
under certain circumstances economic interdependence may not promote interstate 
peace. Instead, it can lead to conflict.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. The Impact of Multidimensional Interdependence on MID Occurrence, 
1870-1938.
98
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3.2.4 Economic Interdependence Is Not Related to Conflict 
Conflict may be inevitable in the anarchical international structure. It happens 
irrespective of our desire and is a natural phenomenon; even through this 
phenomenon can be researched and evaluated, it cannot be abolished and can never 
occur under the influences of economic interdependence. Barry Buzan maintains that 
since 1945, military deterrence as well as bipolar system is regarded as leading 
factors in the prevention of wars among the major powers, thus indicating that 
interdependence is irrelevant.
99
 What is more, Holsti argues in his article named 
“Politics in Command” that no economic consideration takes precedence over 
security objectives.
100
 Political and military-strategic factors indicate that economic 
interdependence is unrelated to likelihood of conflict or the effect is at the very least 
marginal. Harrison Wagner argues that market power is one thing and bargaining 
power by the government is another, and he emphasizes that whereas market power 
consisting of oil exporting countries can affect oil prices, it cannot change the 
political will of bargaining power, for example, the U.S. policy towards Israel.
101
  
In a nutshell, there is little doubt that we live in a global village under a 
system where economic interdependence affects directly or indirectly individuals, 
states and international organizations. However, the answer to the question of 
whether economic interdependence actually stimulates conflict or peace in 
significant ways is not simple. When it comes to the effects of economic 
interdependence, the answer can be indentified theoretically in two ways: realists 
believe that the influence of economic interdependence increase conflict while 
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liberals believe that economic cooperation and interdependence foster peace in the 
world. However, according to dependency theorists, trading benefits just leave in the 
possession of developed states compared to the developing state and after all, trade 
drives weaker countries into a position of dependence. In addition, imperialism in the 
name of interdependence leads to insecurity, even escalating the peril of war. As seen, 
an investigation into whether economic linkages engender a sufficient bond to 
prevent countries from threatening or using of force escapes from the dichotomous 
road, thus characterizing four strands: (1) economic interdependence fosters peace, 
(2) conditional economic interdependence promotes peace, (3) economic 
interdependence leads to conflict, and (4) economic interdependence is not related to 
conflict. When taken together, the following sections of the thesis will analyze these 
theoretical expectations, employing a historical approach to compare two cases, 
Turkey-Greece and South Korea-Japan relations. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
HISTORICAL APPROACH: THE MEDITERRANEAN CASE 
 
 
 
This chapter explores the impact of NATO supported by American foreign 
policy in Turkey and Greece from 1948 to 1965. It will empirically analyze whether 
NATO, which signifies the influence of a security-oriented and political international 
organization, stabilized bilateral relations by eliminating the need for security 
competition.  
 
4.1 U.S. Engagement in Greece  
Following the Truman Doctrine as briefly-discussed in the first chapter, 
American policy was shifting from liberal democratic-oriented to security-oriented 
objectives in Greece, realizing that the Greek situation was chaotic and on the verge 
of Soviet influence. Notwithstanding the fact that American economic aid would be 
achieved on the condition that the Greek government would become democratic and 
the civil war would be eradicated, after the withdrawal of British supports, U.S. 
began to protect Greece on the basis of a Cold War move, namely by forming a 
faction.  
However, the Truman Doctrine was not a complete way out. From another 
perspective, it was taken for granted that the U.S. would bring Greece into the 
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Western sphere and U.S. would have initiative over it instead of Britain. Even though, 
from a Greek view point, American support was “a new breath of life” for a tired 
government due to sharing the security burden to thwart it from becoming 
communist,
102
 the aid entailed some limitation of Greek sovereignty. On top of that, 
American financial aid was given from 1947 to June 1956 to Greece; however, this 
aid did not include security.  
Therefore, Greece‟s first security aim was to join NATO for obtaining greater 
deterrent power. Greece was also eager to establish a regional alliance, a 
Mediterranean Pact under the leadership role of the U.S., which was to include 
Turkey, Britain, France and the Arab countries. This project could not be 
accomplished, mainly because the Americans did not want to get permanently 
involved in the Middle East. Unfortunately, all Greek efforts for NATO entry came 
to nothing, so long as the U.S. was unwilling to add Greece to its burden of Western 
support. Consequently, relations between the U.S. and Greece placed a great deal of 
weight on NATO entry. 
 
4.2 U.S. Engagement in Turkey  
Turkey pursued the American permanent alliance guaranteeing overall 
responsibilities for its security, arguing that Britain‟s participation in a regional 
defense arrangement as proposed by Greece would not be efficient without 
precautions for the Eastern Mediterranean security.
103
 Even though Hüseyin Rağıp 
Baydur, the Turkish ambassador in Washington appealed to George Marshall the 
desire to extend the security guarantees to Western Europe as well as Turkey, saying 
that the absence of American guarantee in Turkey is “hopeless for a small country 
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like Turkey over a long period to stand up under pressure to a great country like that 
Soviet Union”.104 American interest in Turkey‟s security did not permit Turkey to 
become a part of NATO since Turkey, geographically, did not belong either to the 
Atlantic or to the Western Europe.  
Nevertheless, Turkey did not give up pursuing the NATO umbrella. On 4 
April 1949, President Truman in ceremonial speeches declared that the continuing 
interest of the U.S. will cover the countries based on the Pact as well as the „Near 
East‟ countries,105 thus pacifying Turkey. In due course, Turkey became increasingly 
dissatisfied. Then, it increased its political pressure on the U.S. to be included in 
NATO. As a result, relations between America and Turkey placed a great weight on 
the NATO entry. 
  
4.3 Before the Joint NATO Entry  
While Turkey and Greece were attempting to gain NATO entry, relations 
between both countries were cordial. Greece did not consider Turkey any threat, not 
only because both boarded the same ship in security terms, but also because Turkey 
would play a significant role in reducing Greece‟s security costs as a buffer zone 
from the Soviets expansion.
106
 This atmosphere continued during the Korean War, 
which enabled America to reconsider its position about Turkey and Greece‟s access 
to the NATO. 
The Korean War in 1950 was a breakthrough for both states and it led to 
NATO enlargement. Both states dispatched troops to South Korea with the 
expectation of American support for Turkey and Greece‟s entry into the NATO, thus, 
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showing their loyalty to the U.S. Turkey was the secondary country next to the U.S. 
that sent a large infantry scale hoping that this action would bring about acceptance 
to the NATO; thus, it put in a request.
107
 Following the quick Turkish reaction, 
Greece also put in an official request by the Greek ambassador in London saying that 
if the Turkish NATO entry was accepted, the Greek entry should be given the same 
response.
108
 All the Western European NATO member countries rejected their claims 
and the enlargement of NATO, mainly because the extension of the Atlantic Treaty 
would mean a violation of their similar political and economic interests, which were 
based on the same traditions and it would show a devaluation of the treaty to just a 
military alliance against the Soviet threat.
109
 Furthermore, the enlargement would 
bring new economic and military responsibilities and imply extension of the defense 
area.  
America reacted rapidly to the principles of balance of power. New strategic 
assessment by the U.S. that was the only state in favor of the Turkish application 
demanded consolidation of the Western European and Eastern Mediterranean 
defense plan, which was based mainly on Tito‟s break with the Soviets and the fear 
of a second Korean War; this evaluation necessitated a reciprocal security 
arrangement with Ankara, which would present the US with Turkish military co-
ordination, the utilization of Turkish bases and the blocking of the Straits to the 
USSR; thus, as a result of the American support and the good bargaining skills of the 
Turkish diplomatic circles, in 1952 Turkey found itself in NATO.
110
  
It was an asset for the NATO strategy that Ankara had a goal establishing 
ninety-six divisions, of which some forty were ready to be operational and an extra 
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plan adding some eighteen Turkish divisions; these Turkish assets could be effective 
as a means to deter Kremlin from penetrating the Caucasus area and would reduce 
the Soviet satellite that could be used to hit central Europe.
111
 The favor of the 
superpower, U.S. was directed at Turkey rather than Greece, mainly because of the 
immediate goal to contain Soviet expansion.
112
 As a result, the invitation to Greece 
was a consequence of the invitation to Turkey. Considering these factors, on the 22 
October 1951 the admission paper of Turkey and Greece to NATO were signed; on 
18 February 1952 both officially became NATO members. Both states became 
members in a Western collective security organization and the aim of the American 
policy converged with the allies in the West to contain the USSR. 
By the early 1950s, Turkey and Greece got a distinguished position due to 
troops dispatched in the Korean War and emerged as the main actors in the 
southeastern flank in the Western strategic plans. As mentioned, considering the fear 
of the Soviet Union and entry into NATO, mutual peaceful relationship showed 
further progress; moreover, the U.S. who had not been very sensitive thus far began 
to share the Turkish and Greek concerns, realizing the reality of Soviet threats during 
the Korean War. 
 
4.4 After Joint NATO Entry  
Thanks to the American Cold War strategy, Turkey and Greece could 
„institutionalize‟ not only their relationship with other Western states but also the 
bilateral relations with each other, by joining NATO. What is more, both became a 
deterrent to dissuade Soviet penetration in foreign affairs, and neutralized Socialist 
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and Communist movements in domestic affairs. Despite the elimination of external 
threats, both were facing a new phase of cost-benefit analysis. 
For Greece, institutional and structural installation of American bases in 
Greece brought a security guarantee as well as a noose. After the Greek 
government‟s announcement on 12 October 1953, the United States could utilize its 
right to build up bases; to arrange, equip, use and circulate the land, naval and air 
space; American activities and personnel‟s life had the right of extraterritoriality; 
these agreements were to be revised over the years by various ad hoc 
arrangements.
113
 Albeit the agreements would guarantee the Greek security in totality 
and economic improvement in part, the bilateral relations between the U.S. and 
Greece led to some restrictions. By accepting the provision that “appropriate 
authorities of the two governments should from time to time agree to be necessary 
for the implementation or development of approved NATO plans,” Greece should be 
subordinated to American demands, which would be in the name of NATO. 
Furthermore, Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos‟ announcement that if Greece rebuffs 
the ratification of the agreement, “she would be expelled from NATO” entailed that 
Greece‟s NATO entry would become a noose to shoulder burdens beyond 
membership obligations. Consequently, the Greek entry into NATO held advantages 
and drawbacks.
114
 
For Turkey, in a similar vein, its partnership in NATO brought American 
presence and influence to Turkey on February 23, 1945 that would require the 
limitation of Turkish sovereignty in part. The bilateral agreements legitimized the 
American military and communications bases in Turkey to be utilized against the 
USSR, enabling the U.S. to post and supply these bases, and to fly over Turkish 
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territory; the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) presented the U.S. including non-
diplomatic personnel with privileges and immunities.
115
 SOFA‟s disparity caused 
some problems. For example, in November 1959, Lieutenant Colonel Allen I. 
Morrison “ran down a contingent of the Presidential Guard, killing one and injuring 
several others;” however, his immunity made him feel free from discipline. 116 
Therefore, from the perspective of the Turks, the additional rights that allowed the 
stationing of American troops were being recognized as “indirect aggression.”117 As 
we have seen, the American presence in Turkey became a substitute for the 
elimination of external threat from the Soviets, provoking some problems related to 
SOFA. 
Furthermore, the imbalanced aid levels from the U.S. became problematic. 
The ratios in assistance to Turkey and Greece which was deduced by the Greeks 
from accounts of total U.S. military aid from 1946 to 1976 made long-term solutions 
complex. Table 3 shows that Turkey took much more aid than Greece after the Greek 
government defeated a communist-led guerrilla insurgency, regardless of NATO‟s 
mission.
118
 The ratio was the main reason why Greece complained to the U.S. and 
also appeased the Greek public; for that reason, “Turkey and Greece became 
lobbyists” to get more aid rather than accepting their role as members of NATO, and 
the American objective in “arming them to the teeth has vanished.”119 Both states 
had been eager to acquire military and economic aid as well as security guarantees: 
thus, began competing to gain more. In addition to that, an anti-NATO feeling due to 
the ratio might have developed in Greece; in essence, “the more Greece become 
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aware of Turkey‟s superior military capabilities within NATO, the more it adopted 
an exclusive attitude toward Turkey”; after all, the power disparities between Turkey 
and Greece through their joint NATO membership made contribution to the 
continuation of “the realpolitik security culture” in the Mediterranean region.120 Thus, 
ironically, after joint entry to NATO, there was another kind of security dilemma 
within NATO. 
 
Table 3: Ratio of Aggregate U.S. Military Aid Totals from 1947 to 1965
121
 
 
Year 
Ratio  
(Greece : Turkey) 
Year 
Ratio  
(Greece : Turkey) 
1947-1948 29:10 1957 4:10 
1949 19:10 1958 6:10 
1950 31:10 1959 4:10 
1951 19:10 1960 11:10 
1952 6:10 1961 5:10 
1953 8:10 1962 2:10 
1954 4:10 1963 4:10 
1955 3:10 1964 8:10 
1956 5:10 1965 9:10 
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4.5 The Outbreak of the Cyprus Conflict: 1955 - 1965 
 
4.5.1 Brief Historical Background 
Thanks to Cyprus‟s geopolitical position though fairly small, the Island of 
Cyprus since the 1950s has suffered a long-lasting conflict between Turkey and 
Greece, which is mostly seen as an identity-based conflict. The island was controlled 
by Great Britain after the cession of the Ottoman Empire in 1878 on the condition 
that Britain supports the island against the enemy, Russia. After joining forces with 
the Central Powers in World War I, Cyprus was annexed and in 1925 it was reverted 
to the British Crown based on the Treaty of Lausanne.
122
 There were two issues: (1) 
population consisted of a majority of Greeks who made up 77% of the overall 
population and a minority of Turks who made up 17%, (2) ethnic identity difference 
resulting from region and language. Furthermore, Greek Cypriots, as Orthodox 
Christians, had close relations with Greece and Turkish Cypriots, as Sunni Muslims, 
had close relations with Turkey. In spite of these issues and differences between 
communities, during the time of the Ottoman Empire and Britain, both sides 
maintained a peaceful climate.  
During the late 1930s, the status of Cyprus proclaimed by the British 
government was recognized by Turkey and Greece as not vital, not least because the 
former needed the support of the Great Power, and mainly because the latter thought 
that Cyprus had a Turkish minority; both needed a deterrent against Soviet as well as 
German expansion and thereby, from the same perspective, during the 1940s, the 
status of the two communities in the island was not an issue.
123
 For instance, in 
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September 1933, both states signed a Friendship Pact guaranteeing the inviolability 
of their borders and giving a promise of mutual help on matters of common interest; 
in addition, during 1941-1942 when the German occupation of Greece led to mass 
hunger, Turkey sent food and provided the Greek warships with a refuge.
124
 Thus far, 
the Turkish-Greek relations were well underway. 
 
4.5.2 The Emergence of the Cyprus Dispute 
From the early 1950s on, it was certain that with American support Greece 
aggressively began to be concerned about Cyprus.
125
 British policies of division, 
which emphasized the ethnic differences between the two communities on the island 
made room for re-creating deepened diversities in terms of education, religion and 
the resulting lack of a common identity. In the mean time, Greece required the 
unification (enosis) of Greek Cypriots with the motherland, which had appeared in 
1931, in the pursuit of the right of self-determination that coincided with the period 
of accelerating decolonization from British rule. However, the British government 
refused the unification plans of Greece by arguing that Cyprus was under UK 
authority and the two communities in the island had to solve their domestic problem, 
mainly because of its important strategic interests in Cyprus. In 1954, however, 
Greece brought up the question of Cypriot self-determination at the UN Assembly, 
internationalizing the issue.
126
 In addition to that, an anti-British terrorist group, 
EOKA (Ethniki Organosi Kiprion Agoniston – National Organization of Cypriot 
Fighters), which enjoyed the support of the Greek Prime Minister Papagos Athens, 
was founded by George Grivas on 1 April 1955. EOKA attacked the police, military, 
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and other government institutions in Cyprus, which resulted in the deaths of 100 
British personnel and the police. Athengoras, the Patriarchate in Istanbul maintained 
a neutral stance on the Cyprus dispute, by residing in Lausanne in 1923 and collected 
donations from the Greeks in Istanbul who were secretly supporting the EOKA 
attacks in Cyprus. In response, the Turkish public opinion demanded that the 
Patriarch control Archbishop Makarios, thus provoking dormant, corresponding 
Turkish suspicions and Greek animosities.
127
 For those reasons, although the London 
tripartite conference hosted by Britain was organized with the participation of Turkey 
and Greece on August 29, 1955, little progress was made. Whereas Greece in the 
long term stuck to the enosis policy, Turkey maintained its established position with 
respect to the British rule in Cyprus and at the same time proposed a partition 
(taksim) policy on the basis of changing the island‟s status. Turkey‟s threat 
perception at the heart of its objection to enosis was evident due to its belief that (1) 
Greece‟s governing of Cyprus would mean a loss of the southern ports of Mersin and 
Iskenderun, thus posing a threat to Turkey, (2) the existence of a communist party in 
Cyprus resulted in AKEL (Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou – Progressive 
Party of the Working People, The Communist Party of Cyprus) and Greek rule 
would threaten the rights of the Turkish Cypriots there.
128
 Therefore the former 
peaceful relations came to an abrupt end and both countries wanted to follow their 
own path.  
 
4.5.3 The 6-7 September Incidents 
These diversities between the two states affected the domestic politics in 
Turkey and Greece. On September 6-7, 1955, there were bloody events in Istanbul. 
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In general, the suspicions were that the Greek Cypriots had planned to attack the 
Turkish minority on 28 August and the Turkish consulate and the birthplace of 
Kemal Atatürk in Thessaloniki were bombed, which gave a momentum to the 6-7 
September incidents. According to Greek sources, 1004 houses, 4348 shops, 27 
pharmacies and laboratories, 21 factories, 110 restaurants, cafes and hotels were 
destroyed and the compensation given for the widespread damage of the Greek 
minority in Istanbul was insignificant.
129
 Apart from whether the event was the 
voluntary result of public emotion stemming from the Cyprus dispute or a movement 
of intended nationalists directed by the Turkish Prime Minister Menderes, Papagos in 
a rage damaged the regional NATO system in Izmir, by withdrawing all the Greek 
officers; what is more, this event led to fear in the Turkish minority in Cyprus. In 
response, the U.S. Secretary of State Dulles sent the same letters to Prime Ministers 
Menderes and Papagos, emphasizing that the larger interests of NATO and the 
special American relationship with the two states were more important than their 
bilateral interests, brushing off the explanation of the series of events. The American 
intention was to highlight the impartiality of the U.S. towards both countries; 
however the letters raised anger in Greece, which had “the effect of gasoline poured 
on fire,” mainly because Greece considered the attitude of the U.S. and NATO as 
favoring Turkey.
130
 It seemed that the „we-feelings‟ of three countries within NATO 
had not worked; thus, their interests seemed to be far away from basic belief in 
reliability of collective security. The Dulles letters hoped that the leadership role of 
NATO would solve the problem, thus exhorting the high level of convergence in the 
institution: 
Since 1947, the United States has made very considerable efforts to 
assist Greece and Turkey to maintain their freedom and to achieve 
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greater social and economic progress. We have extended this 
assistance – and extend it now – because we believe that the 
partnership of Greece and Turkey constitutes a strong bulwark of the 
free world in a critical area.  
If that bulwark should be materially weakened, the consequences 
could be grave indeed. I urge you therefore to make every effort to 
assure that the effectiveness of your partnership is not impaired by 
present disagreements.131 
 
However, unlike preserving the appearance of NATO alliance at the 
southeastern flank, Greece reacted, as seen, by withdrawing NATO maneuvers in 
Izmir, and Turkey declared martial law in Ankara. That brought to light the failure of 
the American calculation that the U.S. could solve the Cyprus question using NATO 
and the resulting Greek demand of self-determination, which was laid before the UN. 
In this triangle of relations, as long as one‟s interests were not consistent with the 
others, the progress of positive bilateral relations was easy to break and even undo.  
These events and the exchanging miscalculations, which were rare in the 
membership of the common Atlantic security regime, were a lesson to the American 
political leaders. A joint NATO entry did not guarantee complete elimination of 
historical animosities and a path towards peaceful relations. It was hard for the U.S. 
government to understand that these two countries that were under common threat 
from the Soviet Union, and that had been eager to join the NATO umbrella to 
procure large amounts of military and economic aid from the U.S., would allow 
regional issues to get out of control.
132
 Furthermore, for both Turkey and Greece, 
NATO, the institution leading the United States and Western Europe was seen as an 
obstacle to direct negotiation; “bilateral disputes acquire a multilateral dimension” 
and thereby both states could not help pursuing appeal of their respective positions to 
Washington and Brussels rather than figuring the disputes out through direct bilateral 
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efforts.
133
 States, after all, would not be subordinated by multilateral decision-making 
if they have a lack of willingness, mainly because they are not machines, which act 
in a routine fashion, but organisms which can think, act and decide. As a result, 
multilateral institutionalist efforts for a solution formed a triangular system, and in 
the end, the situation became more complex and cumbersome. What is more, 
multilateral responsibility, which is a duty shared by all states in NATO, would be 
useless if no one adhered to it. 
 
4.5.4 British Withdrawal and the Birth of the Republic of Cyprus 
In contrast to the atmosphere of internal security, external security 
circumstances of both countries still included perceived Soviet threat. In 1955, the 
death of Stalin and Tito‟s meeting with Khruschev brought about the consolidation 
of NATO, which led Turkey to lose interest in soothing relations with Greece.
134
 In 
response to enosis policy and EOKA movements, the Turkish Cypriots built up an 
independent taksim policy on the island between the two communities and also 
established their own paramilitary organization, the TMT (Türk Mukavemet 
Teşkilatı – Turkish Resistance Organization) in order to prop up the taksim policy in 
1957.
135
 The tension had augmented into a more serious manner, by 1958. These 
trends of ethno-nationalism led to the widening gap that led to conflict. The Turkish-
Greek rapprochement began deteriorating with the joint NATO entry in 1952.  
At the British Suez campaign of 1956, American pressure deterred Britain 
from achieving its main objectives of abolishing the Nasser government and in 
securing international control of the Suez Canal. Through this event, British power 
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had, to no small extent, decreased in the Eastern Mediterranean and even in its grip 
on Cyprus. In 1958, Britain withdrew from the island on the condition of deploying 
two military bases at Acratori and Dhekelia. In this way, freeing it from British 
influence, regional interests of Turkey and Greece would affect their decision-
making rather than the global common missions the U.S. had assigned to them.
136
 
As time passed, inter-communal conflict and casualties mounted in Cyprus, 
which affected the motherlands to a large extent. Britain‟s withdrawal gave birth to a 
new phase, which demanded that Prime Ministers, Menderes and Karamanlis discuss 
the future of the island. Therefore, the NATO conference permitted Turkey and 
Greece to join informal talks about the unraveling of enosis and taksim in Autumn 
1958. Surprisingly, the talks resulted in an agreement regarding an independent 
Cyprus in Zurich. In the following London summit in 1959, which included Britain 
and both Cypriots, neither enosis nor taksim were accepted by the sides. The Zurich-
London agreements in 1959-1960, which were signed on 16 August 1960 in Nicosia 
and became the foundation of the Cyprus constitution of 1960, declared Cyprus an 
independent state. The Constitution legitimized a Greek Cypriot president, a Turkish 
Cypriot vice president who had a respective veto power on fundamental law by the 
House of Representatives and on decisions of the Council of Ministers in order to 
protect the rights of the minority Turkish Cypriots. However, the constitutional 
structure contained improper functions, which aimed at provoking divisions and 
tensions rather than collaboration and unity.
137
 For example, it was predictable that 
ethno-communal identities were more appealing than state identity and thereby the 
Republic of Cyprus could not form a Cyprus identity. The concept of citizenship in 
the 1960 Constitution, which was written in terms of ethnic origin, language, culture 
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and religion, was problematic due to the following reasons: (1) the Greek 
Community consisted of those who are of Greek origin, have Greek as a mother 
tongue, and have the Greek cultural traditions or who belong to the Greek-Orthodox 
Church; (2) the Turkish Community consisted of those who are of Turkish origin, 
have Turkish as a mother tongue, and have the Turkish cultural traditions or who are 
Moslems; (3) citizens of the Republic who do not belong to the provisions of first or 
second article can select either the Greek or the Turkish Community as individuals or 
a religious group within three months of the date of Constitution coming into 
operation.
138
  
Furthermore, the Zurich and London Agreements were constructed of three 
treaties, which symbolized an imbalanced compromise; even though Cyprus became 
an independent republic, the Treaty of Establishment allowed the British military to 
keep two bases in the island, which violated the basic principles of international law 
and morality related to full sovereignty. According to the Treaty of Guarantee, 
Turkey, Greece and Britain, as guarantor powers, had the right of collective or even 
individual action to restore the state of affairs created by the Treaty. According to the 
Treaty of Alliance, Turkey and Greece could deploy military forces on the island.
139
 
Even the Greek Cypriot leader, Archbishop Makarios, knowing of the Greek 
government‟s pressure and the danger of plausible partition, considered the treaties 
as „a necessary evil‟ that could never be achieved; the Greek Cypriots were 
dissatisfied with the status of the new state whereas the Turkish Cypriots accepted 
it.
140
 For instance, it could be said that because an ex-EOKA leader, Yeorgadjis who 
was one of the most powerful ministers as the Minister of the Interior, established a 
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network system of the former EOKA in Civil Service and the Police. This influential 
political leader threw his efforts into promotion of a nationalistic tendency.
141
 It 
seemed clear that the Greek Cypriots could not break away from the existence and 
impact of the EOKA. By legitimizing the status of the British, Turkish, and Greek 
military forces as guarantors, Cyprus was a time bomb in 1960 waiting for a 
disastrous event to happen. 
  
4.5.5 Thirteen Amendments and the Turkish Plan for the Peace 
Operation in Cyprus in 1964  
Despite becoming a republic and an independent state, lack of mutual trust 
between communities revealed the 1960 constitution to be impractical. Even though 
the central purpose of treaties was the prohibition of enosis and taksim policies, it 
seemed, to a greater or lesser extent, that the treaties provided Archbishop Makarios 
and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Dr. Fazil Küçük with a pretext for going their own 
way. It would be conducive to both leaders that ethnic quotas in executive and 
legislative department were applied. The Turkish Cypriots who comprised 17% of 
the total secured 30% of the portfolis in the cabinet, occupied 30% of the posts in the 
civil service, and 40% of men in the 2000-soldiered Cyprus army. The Constitution 
was authorized to deploy 950 troops of Greece and 650 troops of Turkey. In the view 
of Greek Cypriots, these were excessive privileges for the Turkish Cypriots in 
comparison with the populaton percentage and brought an end to their hope of enosis, 
and worst of all, brought Turkey back to Cyprus.
142
 These classifications incited both 
sides to go toward a different national consciousness such as „Greekness‟ and 
„Turkishness,‟ thus, resurrecting the EOKA insurgency. 
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EOKA‟s movements were advocated by Greek Cypriot leaders for the 
purpose of achieving enosis: Makarios stated that Turkish Cypriots were the horrible 
enemies who were to be driven out and EOKA was the national heroes pursuing their 
duty; Interior Minister spewed out statements such as “Cyprus has always been 
Greek and our dream is for EOKA to began its campaign so it will be realized.”143 
Throughout 1961, EOKA secretly started recruiting, training and organizing using 
disbanded weapons of the 1955-1959 campaign. In due course, on November 30, 
1963 Makarios submitted 13-point amendments to the  constitution to the guarantor 
powers: Britain, Turkey and Greece. Although the revisions did not include any 
radical changes, they sought to remove the veto rights of the Turkish Cypriot vice 
president and to modify the quota system; the Turkish Cypriot leadership strongly 
rejected, not least because the changes meant the destruction of a guarantee for the 
minority Turkish Cypriots.
144
 Consequently, Makarios in 1963 made the Akritas Plan, 
which aimed at amending the Constitution, by outlining the Greek Cypriot leaders‟ 
strategy for enosis and stressing the principles of self-determination. In December 
1963, Greek Cypriots and EOKA began to attack civilian Turkish Cypriots who 
suffered severe casualities; in addition, Turkish Cypriots were dismissed from office 
within the administration units and by putting implicted restrictions on them, it 
seemed plain that the Republic of Cyprus was intended to be a Greek Republic of 
Cyprus.
145
 Thousands of armed Greek civilians encircled the Turkish quarter of the 
walled city of Nicosia, which led to the Turkish Cypriots escaping from mixed 
villages. Therefore, the first three years since the declaration of the island as an 
independent republic produced new conflicts and made no progress in terms of the 
restoration of peace or the formation of a common identity.  
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In response, in a similar pattern, the Turkish TMT began training again for 
inter-communal fighting in 1964. The Turkish Prime Minister, Inönü repeatedly 
warned that the Greek Cypriot leaders should pay attention to the 1960 constitution, 
which was responded by Makarios‟ inaction. At the end of 1963, the Turkish air 
force reconnoitered over Nicosia in low-level sorties and 650 Turkish soldiers were 
placed on the road from Nicosia to the port of Kyrenia on the north coast; a Turkish 
military intervention seemed impending.
146
 The efforts of the UK, the US, Turkey 
and Greece to reach a cease-fire were to remain on the UK‟s shoulder. The US 
president Lyndon Johnson who was just beginning to show himself in world politics 
appealed for a peaceful solution, to Makarios and to Dr. Küçük through a message; 
Turkey believed that the British government could save the Turkish Cypriots from 
being killed; Papandreou in Greece mentioned that a peaceful atmosphere was 
essential; the UN Security Council expected that Britain could bring a resolution. On 
the contrary, Britain languished in its motivation and the Prime Minister, Alec 
Douglas Home in Britain, recommended a political agreement between all the parties 
in response to Makarios‟s demand that he got British aid to deter a Turkish 
landing.
147
 What is more, the U.S. did not get involved in the conflict until 1964 
when the crisis was on the verge of a war, mainly because it would have had to take a 
neutral position in relation to Turkey and Greece, which were members of NATO, 
thus not alienating either side, and mainly because it was worried about the growth of 
the communist AKEL party in Cyprus.
148
 This is a case where common membership 
retarded or even prevented a super power from intervening a crisis situation to find a 
solution. These efforts required a lot of time and on 1 January 1964 Makarios 
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declared a cancelation of the Cyprus treaties, which proved multilateral solutions to 
be complex and actually meaningless.  
 
4.5.6 Johnson’s Letter and Complete Turning Back to Their Own Issues 
The year 1964 of this conflict led all parties to a stalemate. Using the pretext 
of Turkish low sorties which flew over the island at Christmas in 1963, the Greek 
Cypriots‟ attack on the Turkish Cypriots became doubly acute. Turkey warned of its 
intention to intervene with force which was considered legally right by Turkey on the 
basis of the Treaty of Guarantee. Given that the situation took a turn for the worse 
when the London Conference failed on 21 January, an Anglo-American plan which 
could dispatch a NATO peace-keeping force of 10,000 soldiers and 1,200 combat 
troops to the island was originated. However, aiming at drawing communists‟ 
support, mostly from the Soviet Union and at blockading Turkish intervention, 
Makarios suggested to bring the question before the UN Security Council.
149
 In 
support of Makarios who could achieve the independence of Cyprus, the Soviets 
propped him with the purpose of expansion of communism and the foundation of a 
communist regime originated by AKEL, which would be helpful to the Soviets‟ 
future plans in the Mediterranean.
150
 What is more, on 12 February 1964 Makarios 
accepted a U.N. peacekeeping force (UNFICYP), the American Undersecretary of 
State, George Ball‟s proposal, aiming at cancelling the Treaty of Guarantee; on 8 
March Greek Cypriots assaulted the Turkish Cypriots for annihilation before the 
arrival of the U.N. force.
151
 The subsequent developments and the situation soon got 
out of control; Turkish public opinion caused Ismet Inönü to rethink about a hard-
line policy such as a military intervention. 
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On 4 March 1964, the Security Council passing Resolution 186 recognized 
the Greek Cypriot government as the legitimate government of Cyprus; thus the 
Greek Cypriot government considered that it had sovereignty over both 
communities.
152
 Needless to say, this was a tragic decision for the Turkish Cypriots. 
Although they comprised 17 percent of Cyprus‟ population and owned some 34 
percentage of the land, Turkish Cypriots were compelled to live in enclaves covering 
less than 4 percentage of the Cyprus territory. The British and American 
governments were afraid that the Greek Cypriots might cooperate with the Soviet 
Union, which would not have suited the purposes of the NATO. George 
Papandreou‟s argument was that the partition would show that the influence of 
sphere of the Soviets would mean the infiltration of communism in the Greek part of 
the island; independence would indicate “a Mediterranean Cuba”; thus, enosis could 
be seen as “the best of a list of bad solutions” by the Americans.153 Because of this, 
so long as the Superpower kept its global intentions, with the so called Soviet threats 
in mind, the best possible way to end the plight and restore the rights of the Turkish 
Cypriots was virtually ignored. The solution mechanism without considering deep-
seated racial, ethnic, and religious antagonism resorted to a temporary makeshift, 
protracting inter-group conflict.  
The American role was minimal up to the brink of war, especially because its 
involvement required high-level institutional caution. Finally, Ismet Inönü informed 
the U.S. Ambassador Raymond Hare of Turkish intervention on 4 June 1964. In fact, 
Inönü who may not have wanted to intervene and was forced to do so by the pressure 
of the Turkish public opinion and the armed forces, expressed his will with haste, in 
logically considering that if the U.S. were to support the intervention, Turkey could 
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use it as a shield from the plausible threat from the Soviets as well as Greece.
154
 In 
due course, the U.S. was in a quandary and within hours President Johnson‟s letter 
written in quite an undiplomatic style was delivered to Inönü on June 5, 1964 and to 
the Greek Prime Minister later that same month. The U.S. could not play a decisive 
role in solving the Cyprus conflict; it was unwilling to get involved even in the last 
minute; thus, it went along with British intentions and the fear that Soviet Union 
would establish a satellite in the eastern Mediterranean. Why did the U.S. get 
involved so late? One reason could be institutional procedure. Like Ball‟s 
explanation, despite the fact that decision-making is comprehensible in moral terms, 
efficient decisions for a superpower demands “constant high-quality institutional 
vigilance,” due to an individual virtuoso‟s imperfection.155 Such a series of events 
reminds us of the proverb that „too many cooks spoil the soup.‟ Due to the failure of 
institutional efforts which came too late, there was nothing for Johnson to do but 
express his position in a menacing harsh manner. 
Johnson argued that a Turkish military intervention in Cyprus could provoke 
a Greco-Turkish war in which the U.S. and NATO allies would not prevent Greece 
from attacking Turkey nor protect Turkey in the case of a Soviet attack. Johnson 
stated in the third paragraph of the letter the following: 
I must call to your attention also, Mr. Prime Minister, the obligation of 
NATO. There can be no question in your mind that a Turkish 
intervention in Cyprus would lead to a military engagement between 
Turkish and Greek forces. Secretary of State Rusk declared at a recent 
meeting of the ministerial council of NATO in The Hague that war 
between Turkey and Greece must be considered as “literally 
unthinkable.” Adhesion to NATO, in its very essence, means that 
NATO countries will not wage war on each other. Germany and 
France have buries centuries of animosity and hostility in becoming 
NATO allies; nothing less can be expected from Greece and Turkey. 
Furthermore, a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead 
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to direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand 
that your NATO allies have not had the chance to consider whether 
they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if 
Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the 
full consent and understanding of its NATO allies.
156
 
 
Inönü was invited to the U.S. and as it was impossible to reject the invitation, 
thus Inönü accepted Johnson‟s offer of negotiation as a way to settle the conflict. In 
general, the other reasons why Turkey could not intervene in northern Cyprus at that 
time were that Turkey was short of military capabilities for a landing operation and 
the likelihood of the Soviets supporting Makarios was high. Also Turkey lacked a 
political leader‟s intention necessary to carry out the intervention; however, Turkey 
drew the American involvement into the conflict, thus, attaining its objective.
157
  
A superpower‟s ways are different from a relative weaker ally‟s in the NATO 
system, which requires being obedient to the head of the institution. Turkey would 
feel, due to the Johnson Letter, that it had been betrayed by the U.S. for the third time. 
Firstly, Dulles‟s letter implied that only when Turkey and Greece consolidated their 
differences and kept the alliance in a sincere manner, could both take aid from the 
U.S. and would NATO protect them from the Soviet threat. The U.S. attempted to 
use NATO for the purpose of controlling both states. Secondly, as in the Cuban 
missile crisis in 1962, when the U.S. compromised with the Soviet Union on the 
terms that the U.S. withdraws the Jupiter missiles from Turkey and in turn the 
Soviets withdraw from Cuba, Turkey was disappointed with the super power‟s 
devious game.
158
 In the same vein, Turkish political leaders realized with certainty 
that NATO membership in comparison to a Super power‟s will could not guarantee 
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its security from Russian expansion. Thirdly, Johnson‟s letter was an indication of 
how the validity of a NATO guarantee could evaporate when faced with Soviet 
involvement. Ball who saw Johnson‟s letter before sending it to Inönü, said that “it is 
the most brutal diplomatic note I have ever seen,” and added that despite its 
effectiveness, he could not imagine how the U.S. could restore relations with the 
offended Turks.
159
 Accordingly, Turkish and Greek confidence in NATO was losing 
its strength and NATO membership entailed a lot of limitations in the conduct of 
their foreign policy. It could be said that NATO in that case became a spokesperson 
for American foreign policymaking.  
For Greece, Papandreou considered the letter as “an ultimatum of the same 
kind Greece had received from the Nazis in 1940.”160 A careful look at this kind of 
result reveals that Greece had put too much confidence in NATO before Johnson sent 
the letter. Greece recognized that NATO could not be trusted as a security guarantee 
to pull the chestnuts out of the fire. 
In the end, U.S.‟s involvement began on July 5 in Geneva where former 
Secretary of State, Dean Acheson as a mediator met with the Turkish and Greek 
representatives. The first Acheson plan espoused a union of Cyprus with Greece; in 
return, Greece would provide Turkey with certain concessions: a portion of the island 
as a military base in full sovereignty and several Turkish cantons including local 
autonomy. These were welcomed by Turkey on the condition that the Turkish base 
area included the whole Karpas Peninsula. Greece, however, rejected this on the 
ground that the Turkish base was too big and the Greeks preferred to lease a small 
base on the Karpas Peninsula to the Turks for twenty-five years. The Second 
Acheson Plan was a modified version of the first Acheson plan on 22 August 1964 
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and put forward a leasing system of the base to Turkey for 50 years; furthermore, 
several autonomous Turkish areas on the rest of the island were cancelled. This 
proposal, however, was opposed by both, not least because Turkey‟s desire was to 
append a part of Cyprus as large as the Karpas peninsula under full sovereignty. 
Makarios, before Papandreou had made a decision, stated that he could not settle 
anything less than enosis of the whole island.
161
 The Geneva Conference was a good 
opportunity to retrieve Cyprus from the position of a non-aligned state and draw it 
into the NATO system through a union proposal; however, neither side accepted the 
proposal.
162
 
 
4.6 The Johnson Letter’s Impact and Multi-Faceted Foreign Policy in 
1965 
It seems hard to believe that after the letter, the U.S. could play catch-up by 
trying to alleviate Turkish and Greek disappointment. For Turkey, even though the 
Turks gave up their intervention in Cyprus, Turkish-American relations were falling 
apart, which enabled Turkey to reassess its reliance on NATO and to reconsider 
Turkish cooperation with the Soviets. In public, Inönü‟s readiness to compromise 
and Johnson‟s betrayal were criticized. U.S.‟s support for the union of Cyprus with 
Greece was regarded as approval when it comes to Greek Cypriots‟ armament, which 
could be used to kill the Turkish community at will; in other words, “America was at 
heart in the Greek camp.”163 According to re-evaluation, Turkish political leaders 
began to put into practice a withdrawal of dependence on the U.S. and NATO in a 
multi-faceted way, which led the Turkish-American alliance to cool. Consequently, 
notwithstanding that Turkey kept its NATO membership and continued to maintain 
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good relations with the U.S., it began to pursue a more independent way and sought 
greater freedom of action in decision-making.  
The Turkish multi-dimensional way led to a rapprochement with the Soviet 
Union. The new perception was that if Turkey had closer relations with the Soviets, 
this could reduce the Soviet help to the Greek Cypriots. This perception reinforced a 
significant change of policy; the Soviet Union opposed enosis lest the U.S. 
occupation of the military bases on the island. In addition to common interests on 
Cyprus, since the Soviet Union had pursued an improvement in its relations with 
Turkey, “the Soviet-Turkish détente developed quickly”; thus, at least Turkey could 
form better relations with Moscow and lessen its dependence on the U.S.
164
 It 
seemed plain that Turkey who had been an invariably staunch ally in NATO for two 
decades, began to follow its own independent foreign policy, by shaking hands with 
the Soviets who had been an enemy for two decades. In short, albeit building bridges 
with the Soviets did not mean that Turkey turned completely against the U.S. and 
went over to the opposite party, Turkey did not necessarily comply with all 
American policies but took a more balanced attitude towards NATO membership and 
the Cyprus conflict.  
A series of events would imply that the NATO system was defective, given 
the change of a security partner. In fact, Turkey in 1965 opposed the building up of a 
Multilateral Force (MLF) of nuclear weapons within NATO. After Süleyman 
Demirel came to power in November 1964, he succeeded in developing a multi-
faceted foreign policy; in 1965, Demirel mentioned that “belonging to a particular 
alliance … does not preclude any state from improving its relations with members of 
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another alliance or with Third World states.”165 In the same year, Demirel banned 
Turkey from allowing American use of military bases, which the U.S. were using for 
reconnaissance flights over Soviet territory, and Turkey started to form new relations 
with the Soviet Union in terms of politics and economy. It could be said that 
yesterday‟s enemy became tomorrow‟s bedfellow.  
In conclusion, considering the limited impact of NATO on state behavior, it 
should be no surprise that countries have reservations. In the first stance from 1948 
to 1955, Turkish-Greek relations were under détente periods of relationship, in 
essence, the relations looked hopeful, in an attempt to eliminate long-lasted 
differences. Joint NATO entry in 1952 and co-establishment of the Balkan Pact of 
1954 indicated a way towards a peaceful and lasting solution, against a potential 
Soviet threat. However, after joint NATO membership, both states ironically turned 
to regional issues. In the end, the year 1955 was a turning point of bilateral relations 
with the Cyprus dispute, which revealed that the sphere of influence of NATO on the 
nature of Turkey-Greece relations had been marginal and unimportant. The 
involvement of NATO and the U.S. made the Cyprus conflict more complex. The 
multilateral system put off solutions, leaving a lot of casualties; thus relations 
between Turkey and Greece evolved negatively then on.  
Especially after the Johnson letter, positive bilateral relations faded, more 
exactly trilateral relations including the U.S. forced both countries to turn back to 
their own interests, mainly because Turkey and Greece realized that NATO could be 
a superpower‟s tool, to bring both states to their knees. NATO and the American 
ways, which stuck to protecting the southeastern flank from Soviet involvement 
could not effectively restrain taksim and enosis policies from paving their individual 
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ways; surprisingly, the U.S. supported enosis, justifying that by protecting Cyprus. 
As a relatively small state in an era of great-power confrontation, Turkey‟s and the 
Turkish Cypriots‟ positions were glossed over. An argument that NATO is a catalyst 
of peace settlement in the world has no great weight in this case. Now, historical 
events substantiate that NATO gave the appearance of a system of bilateral 
agreements regulating relations, which hardly stimulated peaceful settlement of 
conflicts between member states.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
HISTORICAL APPROACH: NORTH EASTERN ASIAN CASE 
 
  
 
This chapter examines the process of normalization between South Korea and 
Japan supported by American foreign policy from 1948 to 1965. It will also 
empirically analyze whether the evolution of economic relations as an inception of 
bilateral economic interdependence positively influenced peaceful bilateral relations 
by alleviating the mutual deep-seated animosity and need for security competition.  
 
5.1 U.S. Engagement in Japan  
The main American foreign policy in East Asia after the Second World War 
was to attain renewed relations between Korea and Japan. In October 1948, seeking 
to encourage better relations between the ROK and Japan, General MacArthur 
invited President Rhee to meet Japanese officials in Tokyo, and in January 1949 he 
received the ROK diplomatic mission at the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers (SCAP) General Headquarters. In spite of being aware of the historical 
enmity, American officials expected the development of a new pattern due to 
recognition of the profits of economic cooperation due to their geographical 
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proximity.
166
 With this in mind, SCAP intended to wipe out the material legacy of 
Japan‟s imperialism and to simultaneously establish democracy in Japan. In the same 
vein, the American policy in Japan seems to have two fundamental objectives: firstly, 
to ensure that Japan would never again become a threat to the U.S. or to the peace 
and security of the world, and secondly, to build up a peaceful democratic 
government in Japan selected by the Japanese people and pursuing the objectives of 
the United States and the principles of the United Nations.
167
  
Japan was re-established as a democratic state under American control. The 
government document entitled “United States Initial Post Surrender Policy for 
Japan” defined four main goals for accomplishing these objectives: (1) clarification 
and restriction of Japan‟s territorial sovereignty; (2) the entire disarmament and 
demilitarization of Japan; (3) support for basic human rights for the Japanese people 
and the creation of democratic and representative institutions, and (4) economic 
development adequate for the peacetime requirements of the Japanese people. With 
this mission, General MacArthur of SCAP effectively disarmed and demobilized 2.6 
million soldiers and furthermore ordered the removal from public office of about 
200,000 elite members related to the military, bureaucracy and political, 
ultranationalist, business, and communications organizations.
168
 The lawful 
foundation for Japan‟s permanent demilitarization was represented by Article 9 of 
the revised Japan Constitution as follows: 
 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, 
the Japanese people forever renounce war as a severing right of the 
nation and the threat of use of force as means of settling international 
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disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, 
land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be 
maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be 
recognized.
169
  
 
With the guarantee of Japan‟s internal and external security through 
American occupation, MacArthur transferred sovereignty from the Emperor to the 
people; renounced war and the nation‟s right of war, and guaranteed all citizens‟ 
comprehensive civil liberties under the Diet, leaving the Emperor‟s position as a 
symbolic head of state and of national unity. 
However, the American policy in Japan was forced to change. In the late 
1940s, the old world order changed because of the eclipse of China, and the 
ambiguous intention of the People‟s Republic of China (PRC) which would be seen 
as the successor to Japanese leadership in East Asia, and the rapid emergence of the 
Soviet Union as a superpower heading the communist bloc. In addition, relations 
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union quickly deteriorated.
170
 It seemed to be that 
Soviet-led forces of world communism would make use of any strategy necessary to 
fill the power vacuum in the Far East, establishing footholds in China, the North of 
Korea and in South East Asia. With the advance of the Cold War, American policy 
towards Japan changed in accordance with its China policy. The emergence of 
Communist China on the mainland in 1949 necessitated a reassessment of the role of 
defeated Japan, which would be a stronghold against communist expansion in Far 
East in the eyes of the U.S.  
Finally, the U.S. would entrust Japan with a leadership role in East Asia. 
During the years 1948 and 1949, when instead of troops of Chiang Kai-shek, Mao‟s 
forces occupied Manchuria as well as most of China north of the Yangtze River, the 
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U.S. made a plan to develop the stability of the Japanese economy. The original 
purpose of weakening Japan‟s competitiveness in the world markets changed to 
reconstructing Japan‟s economy; thus, a strong Japan would play a decisive role in 
building a buffer system against a likely Soviet expansion in East Asia and it would 
be a strategic outpost of the America-East Asian security system.
171
 Therefore, 
American policy toward Japan transformed from complete removal of its economic 
infrastructure into the rehabilitation of Japan for its new mission as the leader of the 
Far East, mainly due to the emergence of PRC and the growing threat from the 
USSR.  
 
5.2 U.S. Engagement in South Korea  
It became evident that U.S. foreign policy of East Asia was difficult to apply 
to the Korean society. Koreans had been eager to live in a unified Korea and were 
against this separation under the control of the Allied Powers, not least because they 
had a subjugated fear once again of foreigners. Furthermore, MacArthur‟s objection 
to recognize the Korean interim government and people‟s committees led by Yo Un-
hyong, which had been set up by the Koreans soon after the Japanese surrender and 
which endowed power to the so-called U.S. Army Military Government in Korea 
(USAMGIK), caused political confusion in Korea for three years from September 
1945 to August 1948.
172
 As seen, even though the U.S. mission to disarm the 
Japanese military forces in Korea was comparatively easy, the maintenance of order 
and establishment of government were very difficult to attain.  
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The U.S. policy toward Korea was for the most part improvised and 
inconsistent. The U.S. military commander in Korea, General Hodge, did not possess 
the political sensitivity and ability of MacArthur in Japan and took a harsh attitude 
toward the Korean people. Unlike MacArthur who received the “United States Initial 
Post-Surrender Policy for Japan,” Hodge did not receive lucid instructions under the 
“Basic Initial Directive,” which did not retain political democratization or economic 
reforms; as a result, it could be said that American security priority and attention 
were placed on Japan and China rather than Korea.
173
 Furthermore, despite American 
democratic ideals, the USAMGIK failed to achieve its political goal of laying down 
plans for a future democratic process. World War II had made a close connection 
between the U.S. foreign and military policies. Foreign policy had been an adjunct of 
U.S. military strategy; the War and Navy departments had more voice in some 
foreign policy decisions than the State Department. The words of the Chiefs of Staff 
were the most powerful next to the President. 
More seriously, the U.S. policies led to a strong possibility of a communist-
ruled ROK. In April 1948, American National Security Council had three choices: 
(1) abandon ROK; (2) keep political and military accountability for it; or (3) extend 
aid and assistance in terms of security and economy to prevent a breakdown. Thus, a 
month after the establishment of ROK, the American forces started a phased 
withdrawal, leaving an army of about 170,000- North Korean soldiers as opposed to 
16,000 South Korean soldiers.
174
 The reasons why Rhee‟s repeated requests before 
the Korean War were rejected could be accounted for by three factors: U.S. strategic 
planning did not regard ROK‟s security as high priority; the U.S. could not be sure of 
Rhee‟s intention concerning an attack on North Korea due to public opinion; 
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American military stockpiles were over-expanded and depleted, and thereby the U.S. 
was unwilling to spend additional military budgets.
175
  
There were possibly two other reasons. Firstly, the new communist 
movements were challenging the U.S., which propelled Truman to adopt a wait-and-
see approach. For example, not only was there the huge issue of the fall of China and 
the resulting establishment of the PRC but also in February 1950, the PRC and the 
Soviet Union signed an Alliance and Mutual Assistance agreement, which promised 
mutual support to the extent of “all necessary measures for their common objective” 
of deterring Japanese re-establishment and the U.S. exclusive occupation of Japan. 
Thus, despite Washington‟s recognition of South Korea‟s strategic importance, its 
military and economic support remained nothing in comparison with the Soviet 
support to North Korea.
176
 Secondly, the U.S. had been suffering from a shrinking 
army. Greece, Italy, Korea, and Palestine as plausible war areas were beyond 
American Army‟s power, which was distributed in four under-strength divisions in 
Japan, with five divisions in Europe and another five under-strength divisions in the 
U.S.; consequently, the 10,000 additional troops urgently needed by General Hodge 
were unrealistic.
177
 For those reasons, notwithstanding President Truman‟s argument 
that “if we do not do it [additional aid], we are absolutely certain that the whole 
situation in Korea will collapse and Korea will fall into the Communist area,”178 The 
U.S. was forced to pursue a wait-and-see policy. 
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5.3 The Korean War on 25 June 1950 
The Korean War was a curse for ROK and it was a blessing for Japan. The 
tragic partition of the Korean peninsula in 1948 and the Acheson declaration in 1950 
reached an unfortunate climax from 1950 to 1953. Whether the real motivation was 
American negligence toward ROK or not, ROK faced a formidable and troubled 
situation owing to the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950, whereas Japan 
had a good opportunity to revive its economy and more importantly to regain its 
sovereignty. This was because the logistical demands of the fighting of American 
forces were met by Japanese products, which enabled Japan to achieve its postwar 
economic reconstruction; furthermore, Japan in 1951 made a Security Treaty with 
the U.S. who acknowledged the importance of Japan as the last bulwark. Also Japan 
joined the United Nations in 1956, which eventually led it be an influential member 
of the international society, erasing the dishonor of the defeated state of the Second 
World War.
179
 That is, the U.S., who was staunchly seen as the leader state of liberal 
democracy, began to support Japan in the name of blocking the Communist 
expansion.   
These developments increased anti-Japanese sentiment within ROK. What 
South Koreans, who were newly liberated from Japanese colonization had been 
wishing for, was to become a unified state and it seemed that “Japan was enjoying a 
snug prosperity and a snug safety mainly by reason of the sacrifice of Korea.”180 For 
that reason, all Japan-ROK talks, which had begun as a suggestion of the U.S., 
pursued restoration of diplomatic relations. However, the results led nowhere. Worst 
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of all, 2 million Koreans in Japan who had lived there since before the war had been 
forced to move into Japanese labor camps during the war and had experienced a lot 
of discrimination. Approximately 500,000 to 600,000 Koreans, who remained in 
Japan due to ROK‟s political uncertainty and unrest, were dealt with as “a nuisance”; 
their routine life was constantly overseen on the basis of the Aliens Registration 
Ordinance, which later became a law; they were deterred from participating in 
political activities, civic movements and even business organizations.
181
 Therefore, 
Japan acted in an unfriendly manner to its Korean residents and in response, South 
Korea did not have diplomatic relations with Japan, its closest neighbor, for about 
two decades, still keeping its historical animosity. 
With regard to ROK, the three-year Korean War made South Korea a special 
American client-state in terms of military, economy and diplomacy. Soon after the 
outbreak of the War, the Rhee accepted the U.S.-led United Nations intervention in 
the ROK. At the starting point, with the consensus among all main decision makers 
that “whatever had to be done to meet this aggression had to be done,” the U.S. 
commenced South Korea‟s defense: strategic decision-making, operational control, 
actual fighting, military training, and the logistics. This help and military dependency 
on Washington was inevitably connected with economic dependency. By September 
1951, physical losses amounted to almost $2 billion, which was beyond ROK‟s gross 
national product for 1949; the industrial assets suffered substantial damage; ROK 
came to shoulder the burden of an influx of two million North Korean refugees; 
everything collapsed; in due course, ROK‟s economic rehabilitation efforts depended 
on massive aid from the United States.
182
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With respect to the U.S., its containment policy was extended from Europe to 
North Eastern Asia. South Koreans rejected the armistice agreement because of the 
fact that the agreement meant everlasting partition of the country, by letting Korea 
lose a strong racial homogeneity and the loss of fundamental industrial resources, 
which North Korea had a large amount of; that is, it was a road with no turning back. 
However, Rhee was persuaded because of a Mutual Defense Treaty between ROK 
and the U.S. and the promise of huge economic aid in concord with the armistice 
agreement. In addition, about 40,000 American troops, which were stationed in ROK, 
played a significant role as “a deterrent” to Pyongyang and “a reassurance” to 
Seoul.
183
 After the Armistice Agreement in 1953, American policy toward the ROK 
changed, not only because Japan achieved a high level of economic reconstruction 
but also PRC rose as a communist leading power in Asia during the Korean War. 
Thus the U.S. encouraged the ROK to have closer economic links with Japan, which 
meant ROK would become an economic appendage to Japan.
184
 Therefore, the War 
was instrumental in making the U.S. reconsider Japan as a security partner and ROK 
as its satellite, and in getting deeply involved in ROK, which the U.S. had neglected 
owing to the Acheson Line; what is more, the anti-Japanese sentiment was reignited.  
 
5.4. The Efforts for Normalization  
In the midst of the ROK‟s peril occasioned by the Korean War, American 
realization about the strategic value of the Korean Peninsula took shape within 
normalization of relations between ROK and Japan. Japan, like the Secretary of State, 
Dulles and Dean Rusk, was convinced that diplomatic and economic relations 
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between the two countries were the one and only solution for the peace and security 
of East Asia.
185
 As a consequence of these factors, normalization of relations was left 
to be decided by the ROK; thus, it is necessary to analyze the South Korean attitude 
and reaction. In the 1950s, American and Japanese realization and efforts led 
nowhere due to the public anti-Japanese sentiment, which made South Korean 
political leaders such as Syngman Rhee and Chang Myon hesitate to give a definite 
answer to the normalization request. However, General Park Chung Hee decided for 
normalization through practical diplomacy; the decision was based on developing 
ROK‟s economic structure. 
 
5.4.1 Syngman Rhee and the Normalization Talks 
Rhee‟s policy for normalization of relations with Japan came to nothing. He 
was one of the leaders who worked for Korean liberation from Japanese occupation 
and showed dictatorial inclinations by staying in the president‟s office and by using 
coercive tactics
186
, and his advisors remained from the independence movement. In 
consequence, ROK‟s opposition was natural since South Korean political leaders had 
devoted their lives to the independence movement. At this point, there were different 
considerations between the ROK and the U.S. Whereas Dulles thought the 
development of mutual economic and diplomatic assistance between both countries 
in connection with Western Pacific security as the best way in emphasizing the anti-
communist arc stretching from Japan and ROK to Taiwan, the Philippines, and 
Indochina, Rhee regarded Japan as a threat rather than the Soviet Union, fearing a 
revival of pre-1945 Japanese imperialism and asked Washington to stop providing 
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military and economic aid to Japan.
187
 Dulles‟s response in the State Department 
minutes would show that the differences between American global and ROK‟s 
regional considerations reached a climax, as is stated below: 
If Japan goes Communists, Korea will be lost. Since Japan is 
essentially an industrial economy without adequate resources of its 
own, it must live on its manufactures and manufacturing capabilities. 
Unless this process continues under the auspices of the United States 
and the free world, it will inevitably come under Soviet Communism, 
which desires to control Japan as a workshop for war. The Secretary 
suggested to President Rhee that he must recognize as a problem of 
ROK national security the necessity for keeping the Japanese 
economy viable and strong. … Otherwise, Japan might become 
Communist, for it would starve without trade with the free world.
188
 
 
The U.S. concentrated on forming bilateral negotiations with the ROK and 
Japan. Two rounds of negotiations between both countries‟ diplomats during 1951 
and 1952 commenced due to General Macarthur‟s invitation of President Rhee to 
Japan. Japan refused to discuss the ROK‟s property claims.189 After the failure of 
these meetings and South Korea‟s seemingly unreasonable behavior, General Mark 
Clark, the U.N. commander, invited Rhee to Japan in January 1953 to meet Prime 
Minister Yoshida; both states promised their support in the common efforts against 
communist expansion and a resumption of bilateral negotiations. However, the 
mutual clash of attitudes increased as the talks progressed. This problem resulted 
from the statement of Mr. Kubota Kanichiro, the chief Japanese delegate to the third 
talks (6-21 October 1953). His specific points were that: (1) the independence of the 
ROK before the signing of a peace treaty was unreasonable; (2) the U.S. should be 
criticized for disposing of Japanese property in Korea before the treaty was signed, 
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and that Japan reserved the right to claim property in Korea; (3) the 36 years of 
Japanese rule in Korea should be re-evaluated in a positive manner and in view of the 
fact that it had brought spectacular advances to Korea in education, health, 
transportation, and agriculture; and (4) the reference in the Cairo Declaration to the 
Korean people as being in enslavement was an hyperbole provoked by the emotional 
stress of war. In response, the ROK‟s reaction showed a marked contrast with 
Yoshida‟s statement, which caused the negotiations to stop.190  
In the mid-1950s, Japan requested John M. Allison, the U.S. ambassador to 
Japan, to smoothen the progress of the stalemated negotiation talks between Tokyo 
and Seoul; in due course, this suggestion was turned down by the ROK.
191
 Japan 
officially withdrew Kubota‟s statement on 31 December 1957192, and both countries 
opened the fourth conference, which continued from 15 April 1958 to 19 April 1960, 
yet, the April Revolution resulting from Syngman Rhee‟s authoritarian desire to stay 
in power generated the efforts for negotiation to lead to repercussion and suspension. 
After all, Rhee‟s anti-Japanese feelings and background made American 
efforts void. Regarding South Korean-Japanese relations, “inter-bloc conflict did not 
necessarily improve intra-bloc cooperation,” which was akin to Turkish-Greek 
relations from the mid 1950s to the 1960s; thus, Washington formed two kinds of 
bilateral, “patron-client relations” throughout the 1950s.193 As a result, even though 
the U.S. made efforts to reach a rapprochement between the ROK and Japan on the 
basis of containment policy to isolate the international communist movement, the 
normalization of relations for South Korea and Rhee would mean Japanese 
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domination of just another shape. That is, during the first decade after independence, 
the political atmosphere in the ROK was not favorable and even hostile towards 
normalization of diplomatic relations with Japan. 
 
5.4.2 The Chang Myon Government and the Normalization Talks 
After the demise of the Rhee government, Chang Myon was appointed as the 
Prime Minister by the Assembly on 19 August 1960 and his main concern was the 
improvement of the Korean-Japanese relations; the new cabinet had a lot of pro-
Japanese politicians and over 40 percent of the representatives got an education in 
Japan during the Second World War; thus the new political leaders were “not 
dogmatically hostile toward Japan” and did not hold anti-Japanese feelings, which 
enabled the ROK who faced a „serious isolation‟ diplomatically due to Rhee‟s 
authoritarian regime that took an aggressive manner in order to reach normalization 
of bilateral relations.
194
 What is more, in the same line with the Ho Jong interim 
cabinet‟s definite policy in April 1960 soon after the April Revolution, which was 
“to attain the normalization of diplomatic relations with Japan and to promote 
foreign trade by exporting Korean rice to Japan,” allowing Japanese correspondents 
to enter ROK, it was not until two weeks after Chang Myon came to office that 
Kosaka Zentaro, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs was invited to visit the 
ROK. The 5
th
 ROK-Japan Conference was resumed as an epoch-making event on the 
25th of October 1960.
195
 
An early normalization of diplomatic relations was progressing under a 
consensus that Chang and Kosaka both prioritized the need for economic cooperation. 
On 17 August 1960, the ROK government issued visas to representatives of the first 
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Japanese economic mission, even though Japan still did not have official diplomatic 
relations with the ROK. The economic mission headed by the Mitsubishi Trading 
Company examined whether Japanese investment in Korean industry was feasible. It 
made numerous contacts with the Japanese government. The reason why both 
governments now urgently pursued normalization of diplomatic and economic 
relations was due to three factors: (1) the economy, (2) security, and (3) the 
American demand. Concerning the economic factor, the ROK‟s most serious 
problem was to raise funds to keep continuous economic growth, while at the same 
time American military and economic aid kept going down.
196
  
The U.S. began to reduce its influence and at the same time intended to bind 
economic bilateral relations between the two countries. The total American economic 
aid to the ROK was dropped from roughly $383 million in 1957 to $199 million in 
1961, a reduction of about 50 percent (see Table 4); American military assistance 
was also reduced from $230 million in 1961 to $180 million in 1962 and was 
projected to decline to $114 million by 1965 (see Table 5).
197
 In consequence, the 
change in US policy toward the ROK led the Chang government to seek passionately 
normalization of relations with Japan; it was quite natural that Chang‟s government 
had to place high priority on the acquirement of Japanese investment and loans in 
1961 and he attempted to overcome economic difficulties by taking a reparation fund 
from Japan.
198
 Whether the U.S. intended to or not, triangular relations led the U.S. 
to renew the course of negotiations for normalization into a bilateral direction, which 
was apart from outsider influence. 
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Table 4. US Economic Aid to the ROK, 1945-1963 (in thousands of US 
dollars)
199
 
 
Year Total Year Total 
1946 49,496 1955 236,707 
1947 175,371 1956 326,705 
1948 179,593 1957 382,893 
1949 116,509 1958 321,272 
1950 58,706 1959 222,204 
1951 106,542 1960 245,394 
1952 161,327 1961 199,425 
1953 194,170 1962 232,310 
1954 153,925 1963 216,483 
 
 
Table 5. The US Military Assistance to the ROK (in millions of US dollars)
200
 
 
 
Fiscal Year Assistance 
1961 230 
1962 180 
1963 160 
1964 141 
1965 114 
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However, Chang‟s aggressive policy for normalization at all costs provoked 
strong emotional reaction and criticism in the ROK. For instance, anti-Japanese 
demonstrations caused a planned visit by a Japanese economic mission in January 
1961 to be postponed in the last minute. Although Japan on 14 May 1961 stated that 
Korean property claims of the colonial legacy would be paid in the form of a 
Japanese grant. Chang‟s efforts and the fifth round of negotiation talks made no 
progress due to a military coup in Korea, which was a consequence of anti-
normalization treaty riots by students. However, Chang made a contribution to the 
reconciliation and the formation of bilateral relations with Japan, as follow-up 
measures stemming from reduced American support.
201
 
 
5.4.3 Park Chung Hee and the Normalization of Relations 
The appearance of the military junta opened a new phase for normalization. 
Three countries reached a concord on economic cooperation. As a surprising change, 
the U.S. wanted Japan to share or be charged with the burden of the ROK aid, giving 
up the leadership role in aid of the ROK. The U.S. influence in Asia was gradually 
being decreased for four reasons: (1) the U.S. lost its strategic superiority as the only 
superpower because of the achievement of the Russian strategic parity, and China 
and France became nuclear states, (2) American allies in Europe and Asia were more 
and more unwilling to submit unconditionally to American initiatives, which forced 
the principles of collective security to become increasingly less effective, considering 
the Sino-Soviet split, and economic development and nationalistic concerns of 
Western Europe and Japan intensified the difficulties of the American economy, (3) 
American inability in the Vietnam conflict showed the limits of U.S. military power 
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and political wisdom, and (4) the Cuban missile crisis enabled the U.S. and the 
Soviets to start selective bilateral relations in terms of nuclear non-proliferation, 
trade and cultural exchange.
202
 Therefore, the United States wanted to decrease its 
economic aid to the ROK and in the end, “urged closer cooperation between Japan 
and South Korea”; furthermore, it highlighted the realization that Korean safety and 
future progress rested on the revival of congenial relations with Japan.
203
 The decline 
of economic aid to the ROK and the demand of economic cooperation between the 
ROK and Japan spurred both countries to have closer cooperation. 
Regarding the ROK, General Park Chung Hee who graduated from a 
Japanese military academy changed the Korean position toward normalization. He 
could speak Japanese and understood Japanese mentality. Park was initially an object 
of American worry, since the U.S. was strongly opposed to a government founded in 
1961 by a military coup and predicted the political instability that ensued. However, 
Park pursued the same line with the U.S., aiming at gaining his legitimacy; thus, the 
foremost priority for Park, who took an initiative regarding decision making after the 
military coup, was to accomplish economic development with Japanese assistance, 
which was consistent with the American plans.
204
 Park intended to use the reparation 
fund from Japan as an alternative source of investment capital in place of the reduced 
American support and on the way to the U.S. met Prime Minister Ikeda in Tokyo, 
and took all the necessary diplomatic steps in November 1961 with an assurance that 
both leaders would willingly consent to expedite the negotiations, taking a flexible 
attitude toward South Korea‟s property claim. 205  Therefore, as for Park, 
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normalization indicated his legitimacy for political stability and his tool for economic 
development.  
Concerning Japan, the emergence of a military regime in the ROK was a 
blessing for Japan following the Korean War. The former premier Kishi advised 
Premier Ikeda that “This is the greatest opportunity since the end of the war to solve 
the Japanese-South Korean problem. It is because South Korea is undergoing a 
serious economic crisis now and they need money most urgently. This is the time to 
haggle down the price.” In addition, Kishi stressed the possibility that the failure of 
the Park regime could bring communist expansion to the Korean peninsula, which 
would have grave consequences for Japanese security; thus he urged Ikeda to build 
South Korea‟s economic foundation and to solve the property claims in the shortest 
possible time. Hence, when the Ikeda and Kennedy meeting took place on the 22nd 
of June 1961, the former persuaded Kennedy that “Japan and the United States must 
intensify economic aid to South Korea in order to bring about political stability 
there.” With this as an incentive, Kennedy invited Park to the White House on 
November 14, which led to American support for the military regime as a legitimate 
government.
206
 Finally, in late 1961, the U.S. worked eagerly to reach normalization 
behind the scenes, and the normalization of relations meant that South Korean-
Japanese leaders knew a bilateral agreement was only a matter of time. 
However, there were lots of stumbling blocks. Property claims were the most 
controversial ones. When the sixth round talks opened in Tokyo on 20 October 1961, 
Japan was not prepared to finance payments to the ROK. On February 1962, the 
negotiated settlement divided Seoul and Tokyo into property and claims issues. 
There was the difference of property claims subcommittee that the ROK informally 
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demanded a payment of $700 million and Japan only suggested $70 million.
207
 The 
emotional explosion and various demonstrations in South Korea resulted from the 
humiliating diplomacy with Japan, which resulted in the paralysis of Seoul and other 
major cities. Shortly before the normalization of relations, 10,000 students 
demonstrated and about 800 went on hunger strike in Seoul. In Japan, the Socialist 
Party and the left-wing elements took opposing positions to South Korean-Japanese 
rapprochement, mainly because they were on the side of North Korea in terms of 
ideology. Accordingly, when the treaty was submitted to the Diet for ratification, the 
Socialist Party used force to deter the ratification in the Diet. Normalization using 
economic motives did not come easy.
208
 
The U.S. used the normalization which lasted over 14 years as a catalyst in 
seeking a settlement. It encouraged both countries to make bilateral negotiation 
without direct involvement. The American way was evident in the argument of 
William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs: 
 
It was to try to encourage reasonable communication between the 
parties, but not to inject ourselves directly. We would try to explain 
Japanese attitudes in Korea, and by the same token try to explain 
Korean attitude in Japan. But we did not involve ourselves, at any 
stage … in the direct negotiations. All we did was to say that we 
thought normalization would be constructive if it could be achieved on 
a mutually agreeable basis.
209
 
 
The U.S. did not involve itself and encouraged both states. The three 
countries, the ROK, Japan and the U.S worked out normalization together, which 
resulted from three factors: (1) same security alliances of Soviet-North Korean and 
Sino-North Korean defense treaties in the summer of 1961 (2) the nuclear explosion 
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in the PRC in 1964, and (3) American involvement in the Vietnam War. Within this 
atmosphere, in spite of mounting political unrest, especially the South Koreans‟ 
popular demonstrations, the 7
th
 round talks begun on 3 December 1964 and reached 
diplomatic normalization on 20 February 1965; this diplomatic milestone consisted 
of the seven-article on Basic Relations, other agreements, protocols, and notes on 
property claims and economic cooperation, fisheries, cultural assets, and the legal 
status of Korean residents in Japan.
210
 By April 3, all other issues were solved; it was 
finally accepted in the shape of an economic aid package of $800 million allotted 
through a ten-year period (1966-75): $300 million for grants, $200 million for long-
term low-interest government loans, and more than $300 million for commercial 
loans. The Peace Line was drawn by a twelve-mile exclusive fishery zone and Japan 
agreed to return lots of old Korean books and art works. Furthermore, Koreans who 
had lived in Japan before August 1945 and their ancestors were given permanent 
resident status.
211
 
The signing of the ROK-Japan Treaty in 1965, which put an official end to 
the history of colonial domination as well as the two decades of anti-Japanese 
sentiment, was a success of economic cooperation as a solution for hostile bilateral 
relations. Of course, in comparison to two other normalizations, namely Japan and 
the Republic of China who came to an agreement in 1952 declared a bilateral peace 
treaty and establishment of diplomatic relations, and Japan and the Soviet Union, 
which signed an agreement to open diplomatic relations in 1956, this normalization 
between the ROK and Japan in 1965 was quite late, which was indicative of the 
degree of historical enmity between the two nations. However, and more importantly, 
it also meant that their deep-seated animosity was being unraveled by economic 
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cooperation; eventually, the need for security produced the normalization based on 
economic cooperation between the ROK and Japan. The diplomatic achievements of 
the ROK were “a landmark in diplomatic history” of Park‟s regime.212 Whereas anti-
sentiment toward Japan would play a less and less important role in shaping the 
pattern of diplomacy, practical considerations for economic developments became 
more and more vital. 
 
5.5 South Korean and Japanese Economic Relations: 1961-1965 
Both countries decided to solve their security needs through economic 
cooperation and entered into elementary economic interdependence by themselves 
without third intervention. However, there was indeed bilateral trade before 
normalization of relations. 60 major Japanese trading and industrial companies had 
established offices in Seoul and a lot of businessmen had been visiting Seoul; their 
movements were expected to make bilateral trade easier, and even more Japanese 
business leaders fervently pressed on normalization.
213
 The evolution of economic 
relations between the ROK and Japan, as an inception of economic interdependence 
affected South Korean economic growth and in the end, historical enmity was 
alleviated by economic advantages.  
 
5.5.1 Mutual Economic Interests 
Japanese business was concerned about the realization of the dream of the 
ROK market. Notwithstanding the fact that Japan made great economic progress, 
more than in its prewar international economic position without South Korean trade, 
most Japanese businessmen were eager for political obstacles to be removed so that 
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they could enter the South Korean market. The special reasons could be divided into 
two areas. Firstly, in the beginning of 1961, Japan faced serious problems of a 
rapidly expanding economy. Whereas consumer prices rose by 5.3 percent in 1961, 
prices rose to 7.6 percent in 1963, at a very high rate. The rate of economic growth 
sharply decreased from 14.4 percent in 1961 to 4.7 percent in 1965. These economic 
fluctuations led 6,141 small and medium businesses to go bankrupt in 1965. 
Therefore, Japanese businessmen were eager to expand into the South Korean market. 
Secondly, Japanese businessmen had various advantages in terms of communication 
if they traded with South Koreans. As noted earlier, both maintained close cultural 
ties and could easily catch the subtle differences in tacit gestures and expressions. 
Many Japanese who were born and raised in Korea during the colonization period 
knew Korea and had formed personal ties with Koreans; most Koreans especially in 
the business area spoke Japanese.
214
 The detailed efforts took shape by the Japanese 
Korea lobbyists and Liberal Democratic Party who usually knew that “Japan is a 
reformed country that has no desire to recolonize Korea and is able to contribute 
economically in rebuilding the ROK.” They spent between 500 million yen and 900 
million yen respectively; found about 150 national organizations and scattered about 
3 million propaganda pamphlets in lots of publicity campaigns in order to ratify the 
ROK-Japan treaty; in the end, persuaded conservative politicians. In consequence, 
the South Korean market was very attractive for Japanese businessmen, whose 
pressure was “one of the decisive factors” in drawing an early conclusion to the 
ROK-Japan negotiations.
215
 
In due course, Korean businessmen were also eager to establish business 
relations with Japan, apart from political issues. The ROK‟s business group was 
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mainly supported by the Korean Businessmen‟s Association (KBA), which was 
originally organized in 1961 and controlled the economy of the ROK. The 
businessmen belonging to the KBA considered the better Japanese relations an 
opportunity of shifting the direction of their business from the weak domestic market 
to invitation of wealthier foreign markets. They hoped that the highly developed 
Japanese industry including Japanese capital, technology and marketing skills would 
gradually transfer to the ROK; furthermore, the Korean businessmen also expected 
that Japan would liberalize its tariff and get rid of other restrictions on the import of 
Korean products for the purpose of developing the ROK‟s balance of trade. Thus, 
economic interest groups pressurized the government to trade with Japan.
216
 
In line with Korean and Japanese businessmen, Park considered economic 
development as a tool of acquiring political legitimacy. Economic development 
under the Rhee and Chang Myon regimes was unimpressive and was limited by the 
constraint policy under which imports were strongly restricted; the foreign policy 
enclosed “irrationality, emotionalism, and isolationism.” 217  Park‟s regime 
inaugurated a stabilization program and placed heavy emphasis on an export-oriented 
policy, which encouraged free imports and led to more liberal policy measures; in 
addition, literacy campaigns, a new educational structure, and various land reforms 
ameliorated the labor skill, which was needed for rapid development; in the end, the 
restructuring or the adoption of new policies accelerated the ROK‟s economic 
growth.
218
 These arrangements stemmed from the successful Japanese economic 
growth model, which included an export-led policy and the competition of the 
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private firms.
219
 However, despite its qualification and preparation, it was critical 
that the ROK had very little capital and technology for development, which could be 
fulfilled by Japan; that is, the Park and Japan were under “a symbiotic 
relationship.”220 Therefore, whether Park reached political success depended on the 
normalization of relations with Japan and an acquisition of Japanese capital. 
 
5.5.2 Japanese Contribution 
Japanese aid and modern industrial technology became the primary source in 
the ROK‟s economic development plan. As noted earlier, the ROK adopted the 
Japanese model of capitalist development. As a representative economic plan, the 
ROK‟s First Five-Year Plan (FFYP) from1962 to 1966 emphasized too much 
“austerity,” in order to increase national savings with the purpose of expediting the 
accumulation of domestic capital. In spite of its rigidness, the sudden increase in 
imports, and high inflation, it is worthy to note that the plan gave a general direction 
for the economy, often termed as “a miracle on the Han River.”221 The FFYP was 
concluded with abundant accomplishments; by the end of 1966, the ROK‟s industrial 
production doubled in comparison with that of 1961; exports increased from $33 
million in 1960 to more than $250 million in 1966 which far exceeded the target of 
$137 million; gross national product (GNP) grew from 1.9 percent in 1960 to 13.4 
percent in 1966; thus, the plan led to the prospect of economic development of the 
ROK.
222
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Firstly, Japanese capital would make a huge impact in South Korea and 
enable it to achieve one of the world‟s highest rates of growth in GNP. These in 
addition to private loans amounting to $300 million constituted a main economic 
breakthrough. Japanese merchandise flooded the South Korean market, and thereby 
the ROK built modern factories and purchased the necessary resources to produce 
export products with loans from Japan; thus its economic reconstruction contributed 
to the launch of the FFYP, which led the ROK to be sustained by Japan in terms of 
economy.
223
 For example, Japanese assistance totaled nearly $630 million in the 
ROK‟s FFYP, which amounted to 29 percent of the total foreign capital. What is 
more, despite its extended time periods up to 1978, Table 6 shows that Japanese 
companies were evidently more active as investors than American companies who 
invested $194 million in 116 cases.
224
 It could be said that Japanese loans and 
investments were the most important elements for the rapprochement between the 
ROK and Japan.  
 
Table 6. Foreign Investments in South Korea: 1962-1978
225
 
 
 
Country 
Number of 
Cases 
Percentage 
Amount 
(in million 
dollars) 
Percentage 
United States 116 13.5 193.9 19.2 
Japan 665 77.6 583.6 57.9 
Netherlands 4 0.5 72.3 7.2 
All countries 857 100.0 1,008.4 100 
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Secondly, Japanese technology was more suitable for South Korean demands. 
Both countries‟ industrial circumstances were similar in relation to saving of space, 
energy and material; in addition, other Japanese elements were regarded as relevant 
to the ROK‟s economic structure in the early 1960s.226 Japanese businessmen were 
willing to install joint venture operations with ROK, by taking into account that this 
kind of trade style would easily reduce anti-Japanese feeling in the ROK and make it 
easier to control Korean workers. They also availed of the geographical proximity, 
cultural affinity, active government encouragement, and comparable legal systems. 
For those reasons, as seen in Table 7, Japan made 564 technological-licensing 
agreements with the ROK; thus, they effectively penetrated into the ROK‟s 29 
specialized industrial complexes and two free trade zones; in particular, Japan built 
76 Japanese enterprises in the Masan Free Trade Zone, in comparison with only 4 
such American enterprises.
227
  
 
Table 7. Foreign Technology Transfer to South Korea: 1962-1977
228
 
 
Country 
Number of 
Cases 
Percentage 
Royalty Paid 
(in million dollars) 
Percentage 
United States 209 23.0 46.9 27.3 
Japan 564 62.1 89.1 51.9 
West 
Germany 
39 4.3 10.8 6.3 
All countries 905 100.0 171.6 100.0 
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Third, bilateral trade created the ROK‟s trade deficit as a natural consequence. 
Even though under the recognition that both the U.S. and Japan viewed the economic 
stability of the ROK as essential to regional security, South Korean-Japanese 
bilateral achievements such as aid and technology transfer were fruitful, the bilateral 
economic relations were imbalanced. Japan did not work for nothing when helping 
the ROK‟s economic development. The goals of the Japanese government through 
economic co-operation with the ROK are as follows: (1) to advance Japanese 
economic interest by promoting exports, securing supplies, and creating a positive 
climate for commercial business activities in the ROK; (2) to build up and reinforce 
the South Korean-Japanese relations; (3) to make the political, economic, and social 
systems in the ROK stable; (d) to set up Japan‟s status and influence in both regional 
and global international politics.
229
 As a consequence of these factors, the ROK‟s 
export-led policy accelerated the promotion of its imports from Japan. Park allowed 
all Korean firms to import manufacturing equipment on the condition that the import 
price could not be beyond the values of export earnings. The ROK‟s low wages 
which were one-sixth of those of Japan and export-oriented policies were seen as an 
opportunity by Japanese businessmen.
230
 Thus, as seen in Table 8, the promotion of 
imports with the rise in exports led to a trade deficit. The ROK‟s trade deficit with 
Japan amounted to $123 million in 1965. What is more, the deficits and the 
continuous desire to expand exports to satisfy debt obligations revealed the ROK to 
be highly susceptible to the mainstream of international markets; finally, this resulted 
in high rate of inflation, sudden wage rises, and a lack of consumer goods.
231
 As can 
be seen, there were negative side effects of bilateral trade.  
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Table 8. Bilateral Trade between the ROK and Japan: 1961-1965 
 (In Millions of US Dollars)
232
 
 
Year 
Japan ROK 
Imports 
from ROK 
Exports 
to ROK 
Imports 
from Japan 
Exports 
to Japan 
Trade 
Deficit 
1961 22 126 69 19 50 
1962 28 138 109 23 86 
1963 27 160 159 25 134 
1964 42 109 100 38 62 
1965 41 180 167 44 123 
 
However, generally speaking, the export-promotion policy brought a very 
rapid growth of export earnings, which could be evaluated as a successful one. The 
policy was motivated by the following factors: (1) the failure of restriction policy 
pursued by former political leaders, (2) poor condition of Korea‟s natural resource 
endowment, (3) the decline of the American assistance, (4) a well-motivated labor 
force with a high educational level and relatively low wages, and (5) Park‟s will to 
attain a high rate of growth.
233
 As a result of these factors, South Korea was able to 
rise from the ashes of the Korean War, and with special reference to exports was 
widely recognized as an epoch-making success in economic terms. As noted earlier, 
it was impossible to achieve this but for Japanese aid and technology transfer; the 
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miracle of Han-River was a joint workmanship of the ROK‟s export-oriented policy 
and the Japanese capital.  
Even though it is hard to evaluate the exact function of the Japanese capital 
and technology in the ROK‟s economic growth, there is no doubt that they played a 
prominent role. It is widely believed that perspectives of both countries were 
changing from deep-seated animosity to one of mutual economic cooperation. Even 
though South Korea had a history of past grievances to justify its rigid position and 
to define the future, its economic need and desire to develop created trust, common 
interests and a common perspective with Japan for the future. As noted earlier, 
Japanese economic aid, technology transfer, trade, capital investment and loans 
enabled ROK to achieve rapid economic growth and to reaffirm a shared strategic 
outlook. Therefore, there is no doubt that normalization of relations between two 
countries in the economic structure in 1965 gained a new dimension from that of 
enemies to that of essential economic and security partners. 
In conclusion, given the emergence of PRC and the impending threat of the 
Soviets, American policy toward Japan changed from one of entire elimination of its 
economic infrastructure into the rehabilitation of Japan, whereas the U.S. policy 
toward the ROK was to pursue a wait-and-see policy, putting priority on Japan. 
However, the Korean War was instrumental in making the U.S. reconsider Japan as a 
security partner and ROK as its satellite, the Korean peninsula separated the two 
states, and Japan resuscitated its depressed economic situation and risked reigniting 
anti-Japanese feelings. Owing to American containment policy against communist 
expansion, despite the U.S. and Japan‟s view of diplomatic and economic relations 
between the ROK and Japan as most vital for the peace and security of East Asia, 
Rhee‟s hostility and anti-Japanese demonstrations under the Chang Myon 
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government meant that normalization of diplomatic relations with Japan started to 
become unfavorable and even hostile.  
With the emergence of Park who was pro-Japanese, the decline of American 
aid and the influence of ROK, and Japanese businessmen‟s desire to enter the Korean 
market opened a new phase for normalization. Internationally, there were two 
security alliances of Soviet-North Korean and Sino-North Korean defense treaties in 
the summer of 1961, the nuclear development of the PRC in 1964, and American 
engagement in the Vietnam War. Internally, the anti-normalization demonstrations 
were natural since the South Koreans were afraid of a re-emergence of Japanese 
imperialism and pushed on in their demands relating to poverty and sex slavery 
claims to the end. However, with the American role as a catalyst in seeking a 
settlement, Park‟s economic development policy and the Japanese desire to enter 
new markets and a cheap labor force, a previously inconceivable normalization was 
reached in 1965, which lasted for over 14 years.  
Overall, economic needs dispensed with deep-seated problems and were 
inextricably bound up with each other, forming bilateral economic relations. In spite 
of the ROK‟s trade deficit, Japanese capital, loans and technology transfer made a 
huge impact on South Korea and enabled it to achieve the miracle of Han-River. 
Therefore, as a causal impact on betterment of ROK-Japan relations, trade was 
significantly regarded as a contributory factor since economic bilateral cooperation 
was able to eliminate obstacles to the brotherly existence between the two North 
Eastern Asian countries, by improving their relations throughout the years. This was 
indeed quite a different path than the one followed by Turkey and Greece despite 
similarities in the background of dyadic relations. In the following chapter, I will 
analyze how the historical analyses of the Mediterranean and the North East Asian 
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cases fit in the previously elaborated theoretical framework of economic 
interdependence versus political institutionalism. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
ANALYSIS OF A RELEVANT THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
FOR THE CASE STUDIES 
 
 
 
This chapter seeks to explain, from a theoretical perspective, which kind of 
theory can best explain the reasons why the joint NATO entry of Turkey and Greece 
could not help either country to undermine tensions, and why there was little conflict 
between the two trading partners, South Korea and Japan. I argue and show that 
economic interdependence theory is more successful in explaining the anomaly than 
political and security-based institutionalism.  
 
6.1 The Failure after Success in the Mediterranean Case: 1945-1955 
versus 1956-1965 
The failure of institutional efforts in the decade 1956-1965 after the peaceful 
period of 1945 to 1955 can be explained using each of the three theories discussed in 
the literature review chapter. Which one fares better though to explain the 
Mediterranean case? In accordance with the liberal theory, was it true that the 
promise of NATO as the only mechanism in the resolution of conflicts between 
Turkey and Greece would gradually be realized, abolishing suspicious intentions of 
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the two states? Was it possible that NATO membership, which made an independent 
contribution to the long-lasting peace in Europe
234
 would lead both countries to 
cooperate one another more easily, and thus develop a confident climate in their 
region, finally reaching peaceful cooperation and promotion of bilateral relations? 
From the perspective of social constructivism, could institutions through the 
dissemination of information make international actors share the same identity from 
security to cultural domain? For that reason, had NATO helped in the formation of a 
stronger common identity and mutual trust between Turkey and Greece, and thereby 
war would prove to be unrealistic and unthinkable? Finally, as realists would claim, 
was any international institution basically a spokesperson of a superpower, rather 
than an independent tool to mitigate a Turkish-Greek bilateral conflict? Now, we 
should have reservations whether collective security will work or not when the chips 
are down as in this case. Despite the fact that institutionalists seem to be turning their 
nose up at the insights of realism, the empirical record provides little support for 
political institutionalism; furthermore, it is of marginal value in promoting peace. 
Even though it made sense that NATO contributed to the short term success for 
deterrence, it could not achieve bilateral peace in the long term. In order to analyze 
this in detail, it is necessary to examine NATO‟s successes in contrast to its failures. 
On the one hand, it is certain that NATO and the American policies made a 
contribution to the development of forming peaceful relations between Turkey and 
Greece in the early 1950s. The Marshall Plan, the dispatching of troops to South 
Korea, and their joint NATO entry propelled Turkey and Greece to become potential 
friends, hindering them from waging an all-out war. The role of NATO as a helpful 
medium of resolution to this conflict should not be overlooked during the early 
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Cyprus crisis. In addition to that, NATO showed responsibility in this conflict. Had it 
not cared about presence of conflict within the alliance and had Johnson‟s mediation 
attempts leading to the decision of NATO not generated crisis control, the two 
countries might have easily vied with each other using military force. Most 
importantly, NATO thwarted the establishment of a Soviet satellite in the eastern 
Mediterranean. In this context, it is worth mentioning that NATO was successful in 
terms of preventing direct military conflict between Turkey and Greece.  
On the other hand, in spite of these significant successes, the promise of 
NATO in collective security remains unreliable. NATO membership could not 
deliver its promise; shifting foreign policy, drawing multilateral institutional 
procedure, sticking to the balance of power and self-interests. Hence, Turkey and 
Greece brought precarious spirals of conflict within NATO, “creating allied 
adversaries.”235 
Firstly, NATO membership, which eliminated the first threat of the Soviets, 
could lead Turkey and Greece to reflect on their own issues. Notwithstanding the fact 
that what changed was that Turkey and Greece had been admitted to NATO, it was 
safe to say that whereas under the shared fear of the Soviet Union before 
membership in NATO, mutual peaceful relationship made further progress, both 
states after the joint NATO membership focused their regional concerns on subjects 
such as the Cyprus question. With respect to Greece, membership in NATO in 1952 
enabled Greece to believe that it was capable of pursuing enosis policy of union with 
Cyprus, and long before its entry, Greece which had regarded enosis as its longtime 
dream but had waited for a long time for such an opportunity, officially endorsed 
enosis. However, if Greece had not joined the NATO collective security system, 
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Cyprus would have remained relatively peripheral.
236
 Regarding Turkey, before the 
London Tripartite Conference in 1955, Turkey attempted to show its intense interest 
in the future of Cyprus, provoking the 6-7 September events; Dulles letters were 
rejected by both sides. Thereby, meeting the essential security need by an outside 
party caused both to be interested in their internal issues. 
Regarding Johnson and the American perspective, it was hard to understand 
why two countries that had shared the same threat perception with respect to the 
Soviet expansion and had been eager to take military, economic aid and security 
guarantees from the West should start fighting with each other over Cyprus. On top 
of that, far from reaching a common identity and mutual trust in membership, both 
were on the brink of war in 1964 which should have been unthinkable due to the 
members renouncing the thought of violent conflict in NATO; furthermore, the pride 
and value of NATO as the best equipped military alliance institution were impaired 
by the imbalanced ratios, which was doubtless sensitive to the demands of both states. 
Disclosing that social constructivism and liberalism related to institutionalism could 
not substantiate NATO‟s ways, we should have reservations as to why the deterrence 
of the Soviet threats called forth secondary concerns. 
This answer can be followed by three steps: security dependence, free riding, 
and a shift in foreign policy focus. Membership of a multilateral alliance meant that 
both countries depended less on their own military capabilities for security than on 
the power and credibility of their larger sponsors; as a result, both removed the 
security challenge, a shared threat from the Soviet Union, thus becoming free riding 
states; finally, with the understanding that the U.S. would not give up Turkey and 
Greece due to their geopolitical importance as well as U.S./NATO‟s potential costs, 
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which would result from abandoning them, and U.S.‟s reputation as a superpower, 
both states shifted the focus of their foreign policy from global concerns to regional 
concerns; that is, the two small-state decision makers turned inward shifting threat 
perception from the Soviets to Cyprus.
237
 Even though accession to NATO of Turkey 
and Greece was not intended to exacerbate tensions between them, NATO 
membership would have only a minimal impact on peace. Instead, it spurred 
competitive dynamics into regional issues. 
Secondly, NATO membership required multilateral institutional procedure, 
which complicated finding a solution. US tended to look up to Britain for a solution 
and at the same time, resorted to the NATO system, leading to further escalation of 
the dispute. Thus, Turkey and Greece were busy appealing their respective positions 
to Washington and Brussels without direct bilateral efforts. That is, NATO 
membership was not a panacea for security as was expected, neither was the political 
lobbying in the international arena of the two states to get recognition of their rights 
in Cyprus. The interests and policies of the U.S. based on multilateral 
institutionalism could not concentrate on Turkey and Greece. More importantly, the 
U.S. could not keep a watchful eye on both states, and even more, the entrusted 
NATO with the task of overseeing the friction between the two countries. In the 
same line, although US had the closest military cooperation with Turkey and Greece, 
the triangular relations remained open to uncertainty and economic relations saw no 
progress.
238
 Hence, I argue that the more American influence was directed at the 
decision-making mechanisms, the less credible and less hopeful the resolution of the 
Turkish-Greek disputes became.
239
 What is more, regarding the Cyprus question, U.S. 
sometimes glossed over the conflict due to the dynamics of the multilateral 
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relationship by arguing that NATO could handle the problems. Therefore, NATO‟s 
policy became less apparent.  
Thirdly, the failure in the Mediterranean case shows that the driving forces 
were the balance of power not NATO, which was basically a tool of the U.S. 
committed to thwart the Soviet threat and was not an independent variable. John J. 
Mearsheimer argues that “NATO was basically a manifestation of the bipolar 
distribution of power in Europe during the Cold War, and it was that balance of 
power, not NATO per se, that provided the key to maintaining stability on the 
continent.” 240  No matter how NATO forced Turkey and Greece to reach an 
agreement toward a modus vivendi, it could not become a long term solution but a 
temporary remedy. The Americans did not necessarily create the inculcation of full 
democratic ideals and promote peaceful bilateral relations; instead, their motives 
could be caused by almost entirely counter-actions to the expansion of communism.  
For example, U.S./NATO adopted an enosis policy in fearing that the Soviets 
would work with the Greek Cypriots and establish a satellite state, and they aimed to 
get Cyprus under NATO influence. There was another extraordinary instance. The 
implication of Johnson‟s letter that NATO might not necessarily and automatically 
support Turkey against Soviet attacks led to questions regarding the meaning of 
NATO membership. The letter, taking advantage of NATO to threaten Turkey, was 
more efficient for the United States and its allies to balance against the Soviets 
because NATO was stronger than a less formal and more ad hoc alliance. Therefore, 
it can be concluded that the U.S./NATO reacted more in response to the threat of 
Soviet expansion and in protecting the southeastern flank of the security alliance, 
rather than promoting peaceful relations between the two countries.  
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Fourthly, norms of collective security among NATO members depended on 
national self-interests. When it comes to the Dulles letters, the Greek government 
reacted by withdrawing NATO maneuvers in Izmir. The Johnson letter coerced the 
Turkish decision makers to redefine their present security alliance with the U.S., not 
least because the letter seemed to be a threatening tool of maintaining and 
lengthening American initiatives. The U.S. achieved its aims through using these 
letters. Consequently, Turkey started making agreements with the Soviet Union. 
Hence, as realists would predict, each state in the international system aims to 
guarantee its own survival and interests. In a similar vein, it can be said that 
“alliances are only temporary marriages of convenience, where today‟s alliance 
partner might be tomorrow‟s enemy, and today‟s enemy might be tomorrow‟s 
alliance partner. States operating in a self-help world should always act according to 
their own self-interest, because it pays to be selfish in a self-help world.” 241 
Therefore in this way, NATO members were hardly limited by this institution. 
In conclusion, the fact that after two decades of détente periods and after the 
joint NATO entry of Turkey and Greece revived a long-standing dispute, deepening 
their deep-seated rivalry, indicates that realists‟ perspectives are correct in explaining 
their bilateral and triangular dynamics. NATO membership led both states to shift 
their foreign policy from global issues to regional concerns, and demanded 
multilateral institutional procedure for a solution. Washington stuck to the 
containment policy against the Soviet Union, depending on a balance of power. 
Members within NATO adhered to self-interests by deepening an abiding distrust 
and enmity. The empirical record shows that the institution was of marginal value in 
promoting bilateral peace. Although it was possible to say that NATO contributed to 
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the success of deterrence as a stopgap remedy, it could not lead to peace in the long 
term. Notwithstanding NATO might be a stepping-stone to the EU in terms of global 
peace, especially between communists versus capitalists, it was a stumbling-stone to 
Turkey and Greece in bilateral peace.  
 
6.2 The Success after Failure in North Eastern Asian Case: 1948-1954 
versus 1955-1965 
From an empirical perspective, it could be said that normalization and the 
success of economic efforts in the decade from 1955-1965 after the total failure of 
peaceful relations from 1948 to 1954, can be indicative of the perspective that 
economic interdependence leads to peace. In accordance with liberals like Keohane 
and Nye, was it true that the benefits of economic interdependence acted as a major 
incentive for trade, which encouraged the ROK and Japan to keep peaceful relations, 
resulting in greater predictability and mutual trust and a removal of suspicious 
intentions of the two states? On the condition of symmetrical economic relations, did 
the promise of economic bilateral interdependence as the mechanism in the 
resolution of conflicts between both countries promote peace? Or dependency 
theorists argue, were benefits of bilateral trade exploited by the Japanese, postponing 
the economic development of the ROK? Did the peril of war resulting from 
economic ties escalate between the ROK and Japan? Otherwise, was the economic 
interdependence of South Korean-Japanese relations needless, and thereby unrelated 
to conflict and peace, or at the very least marginal? Theoretical and historical data 
suggest that trade reduces the proclivity of the ROK and Japan to engage in their 
bitter past of armed conflict; furthermore that it is of vital value in promoting peace. 
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In order to see this in detail, it is necessary to analyze the impact of bilateral trade for 
the East Asian case.  
It is certain that the previous empirical analysis finds results contrary to the 
insights of realism. Realists‟ argument that economic interdependence would lead 
one side to be more dependent on another and sooner or later conflict arises was not 
substantiated. Despite the trade deficit between countries, the perspectives of 
dependency theorists also turned out to be wrong. This is because benefits of 
bilateral trade left the Japanese as well as South Koreans in possession, giving an 
impetus to the economic development of the ROK. In the end, empirical research is 
in line with economic interdependence perspective of neo-liberalism but not its 
perspectives on institutionalism, not only because the conflict-reducing effect of 
bilateral trade effectively worked, but also because it created broad confirmation that 
trade indeed reduced anti-sentiments and contributed to the realization of economic 
and security partners, considering the three issues below. 
Firstly, the U.S. attitude toward the problems between ROK and Japan was to 
find an economic solution instead of a political or security organization. American-
ROK-Japan security needs reached the same point due to the Korean War, which 
highlighted the communist threat from the Soviets and PRC. These needs arose three 
economic interests, which were interrelated: the U.S. wanted to share their economic 
burdens in the ROK with Japan, ROK especially under Park‟s regime wanted to be 
rehabilitated with Japanese support, and Japan expected new opportunities for a new 
market and a cheap labor force in the ROK. After the military coup in the ROK in 
1961, Japanese and South Korean political atmospheres were consistent with each 
other in line with the American policy. Japanese businessmen were concerned about 
the realization of the dream of the ROK market, urging their political leaders to 
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normalize diplomatic and economic relations with the ROK, not only because Japan 
faced serious problems of a rapidly expanding economy, but also because Japanese 
businessmen had various advantages in terms of communication with South Korea. 
Park greatly emphasized economic development for acquiring political legitimacy 
inside as well as outside, following the Japanese successful model of an export-
oriented policy. Therefore, the choice of this economic solution was more than 
adequate to meet all three states‟ security needs, and even more, created noticeable 
effects to ameliorate the bilateral problems between ROK and Japan. The success in 
North East Asia shows that the driving force was mainly economic. 
Secondly, the U.S. set up direct bilateral relations with both the ROK and 
Japan. The formation of bilateral relations propelled America to care about the ROK 
and Japan‟s situation, which was a huge responsibility. Even though the reason why 
the ROK could get a lot of aid politically, militarily, economically, and culturally 
from the U.S. was not Korea per se and its importance but rather in the American 
stand for its containment policy through collective security.
242
 Then, why did the U.S. 
attempt to form a bilateral system in East Asia rather than a multilateral one? 
Washington began to recognize that the multilateral collective security system was 
not as effective as was expected in Asia, not only because America‟s potential Asian 
allies did not have a collective identity but also because they were seen as an 
“inferior community,” which enabled the U.S. to create bilateral relations with Asian 
states.
243
 Hence, the three states could not establish a mutual security alliance, not 
least because memories of Japanese aggression and the resulting South Korean fear 
motivated the ROK to be unwilling to organize an alliance system that had Japan as a 
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member. In the same vein, the U.S. formed individual bilateral relations with the 
ROK, which emerged in anti-Japanese feelings and Japan instead of multilateral 
relations, which very strongly led it to care about the South Korean-Japanese 
relations. What is more, the U.S. did not need to consider the Japanese position when 
supporting the ROK through military and economic aid, since the three countries did 
not establish a regional multilateral organization. This direct protection and 
responsibility would be difficult to put into practice when forming a multilateral 
alliance. 
Thirdly and more importantly, the U.S. strengthened bilateral economic 
relations between the ROK and Japan. In the early 1960s, American influence 
declined in the ROK and the decision was made to withdraw its auspices from ROK. 
Whether the U.S. intended or not, the ROK and Japan had to actively appeal their 
respective positions to each other with direct bilateral efforts, without a third state or 
the American mediation. In order to reinforce the anticommunist arc stretching from 
Japan and ROK to Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indochina in the Western Pacific 
security, America would support a bilateral solution between the ROK and Japan, 
strengthening direct diplomacy. For instance, Park directly met Prime Minister Ikeda 
in Tokyo, intending to use the reparation fund from Japan as an alternative source of 
investment capital in place of the reduced American support; both leaders struck a 
conciliatory note. In the same way, with Park taking all the necessary diplomatic 
steps, Japan also was the first state in Foreign Investments and Foreign Technology 
Transfer to South Korea, leaving the U.S. as the second state. In the end, Japanese 
loans, capital, technology and normalization based on economic structure contributed 
remarkably to the economic improvement of the ROK; thus, the bilateral economic 
interdependence bore noticeable effects on eliminating historical past animosity. 
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In conclusion, although this thesis does not aim to fully analyze the effects of 
Japanese loans and technology transfer, the main findings are that trade generally 
reduces the historical enmity and thus the likelihood of conflict. We can now state 
with confidence that the conflict-reducing impact of trade between the ROK and 
Japan substantiated our theoretical and empirical analyses on economic 
interdependence. The American economic solution for peace which strengthened 
bilateral relations with both the ROK and Japan, and the resulting formation of 
bilateral relations between them considerably contributed to the pacifying effect of 
trade. Therefore, empirical research shows that trade was the driving force for the 
South Korean-Japanese relations and resulted in the conflict-reducing effect.  
 
6.3 Lessons from the Analysis of Economic Interdependence 
The leading factor about the Mediterranean failure and the North East Asian 
success depended on American solutions such as institutionalism versus economic 
interdependence. From the case studies, we can extract two lessons. 
Firstly, the economic solution was more effective than the NATO solution. 
As noted earlier, there were the same security needs from communist threats, which 
forced the U.S. to get engaged in both areas for containment policy. South Korea was 
valuable to the U.S. because of the significance of Japan, U.S.‟s most important ally 
in the democratic bloc, just like the Greek entry into NATO was a consequence of 
Turkey‟s membership. Due to clear identification of a security linkage between the 
two countries that experienced a bitter historical animosity, the U.S. had to build 
peace between the states. Historically, these were two American experiments. 
Whereas the U.S. employed an institution, NATO in the Mediterranean, in North 
East Asia it did not follow the same strategy, instead employing bilateral economic 
 115 
 
interdependence. As a consequence of this, whereas the NATO solution can be 
interpreted as a short term goal of deterrence, the economic solution can be regarded 
as a long term goal for peace. 
Secondly, the formation of bilateral relations contributed to the removal of 
historical enmity and the establishment of peace more than a multilateral solution. 
Multilateral institutional procedure resulting from NATO membership made the 
solution more complex. That is, Turkey and Greece without direct bilateral efforts 
had many misunderstandings, which led them to appeal their respective positions to 
the U.S and NATO. The U.S. made bilateral relations between the ROK and Japan 
and was responsible for both states. Formation of direct bilateral relations between 
them encouraged more open dialogue, eliminating needless suspicions and 
misinterpretation. Both attempted to meet directly without third party help and 
coercion and normalization of relations came as a natural decision. Whereas the 
Mediterranean case reveals that “the problem is that attempts at peace imposed by 
others may be innately unstable, especially if the underlying differences originally 
separating the countries remain,”244 willing spontaneous bilateral relations get rid of 
the long-standing political barriers in South Korean-Japanese bilateral relationship 
even though there were many difficulties along the way and it took a long time. 
Therefore, in dyadic level of conflict, autogenous bilateral cooperation gives more 
valuable insights for solutions than compelled multilateral efforts. 
In conclusion, unlike other European countries where the additional power of 
a multilateral institution would lead to the formation of the European common 
identity, this was not the case for Turkey and Greece. In this case, the American 
experiment missed the importance of economic bilateral interdependence. Given the 
                                                 
244
 Solomon W. Polachek, pp. 57-78. 
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fact that the South Korea-Japan relations reached various affinities and trust, and 
both countries shared common identity in terms of economy and security, now I 
conclude that rather than multilateral institutionalism, which has only a minimal 
impact on peace, bilateral economic interdependence makes a contribution to the 
development of peaceful relations between two states. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
Both the Mediterranean and the North East Asia dyads ended up at different 
terminus from the same situations during the period from 1948 to 1965. Even though 
both cases faced some commonalities such as historical enmity resulting from 
colonial and imperial periods, external security threat from the Soviet Union and the 
strategic interests of alliances with the U.S., starting from 1965 they took different 
paths. Therefore, the primary research aim of this thesis was to reveal the reason why 
the states in the North Eastern case has come to a „more peaceful‟ convergence and 
the states in the Mediterranean case has reached a „more conflict type‟ of divergence. 
In order to analyze this, in terms of American solutions to both cases, two types of 
theories were employed: institutionalism in the Mediterranean and economic 
interdependence in North East Asia. 
In the Mediterranean, unlike liberals and social constructivists, realists had a 
more reasonable assessment that the institution as the tool of great powers was much 
less successful in the promise of NATO for the resolution of disputes between 
Turkey and Greece. On the contrary, if liberals were to be believed, the promise of 
NATO in the resolution of conflicts between Turkey and Greece would gradually be 
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realized, eliminating suspicious feelings, since institutions were mechanisms for 
putting into practice cooperation and peace. It follows that both NATO members 
would cooperate more easily, and thus develop a peaceful climate in their region. 
Otherwise, if the perspective of social constructivism was reasonable, owing to the 
distribution of information and NATO converging states in a strong identity, it would 
foster trust between Turkey and Greece, thus prevent them from viewing each other 
as threats, and finally war would turn out to be unrealistic and unthinkable. However, 
the historical approach used in this thesis showed that liberalism and social 
constructivism could not substantiate their institutional promises.  
NATO and the American way, which contributed to the development of 
forming peaceful Turkish-Greek relations in the early 1950s and the prevention of 
all-out war, could not guarantee NATO‟s promise in respect of four factors. Firstly, 
as NATO membership freed both countries from the main threat of the Soviets, 
Turkey and Greece tended to shift from a global viewpoint to their bilateral issues. 
Given the situations before and after joint NATO entry, both countries followed three 
steps, security dependence, free riding, and a shift in foreign policy focus. Secondly, 
NATO membership required multilateral institutional procedure, which made a 
solution more complex, mainly because efficient decisions for the U.S. stipulated 
constant high-quality institutional vigilance on the Cyprus question. Thirdly, NATO 
was basically a tool of the U.S., committed to frustrating the Soviet threat. Thus, it 
could not become a long term solution but a temporary remedy. Fourthly, norms of 
collective security among NATO members depended on national self-interests. 
Dulles letters resulted in Greece withdrawing NATO maneuvers in Izmir and 
Johnson letters coerced Turkey to start a security alliance with the S.U. witnessed 
that today‟s alliance partner might be tomorrow‟s enemy, and today‟s enemy might 
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be tomorrow‟s alliance partner, making the Turkish and Greek sides view each other 
as an enemy. Therefore, whereas NATO contributed to the success of deterrence as a 
short term goal, it could not lead to long term peace; even more, it was an obstacle to 
the Turkish-Greek rapprochement.  
In North Eastern Asia, the empirical analysis allows me to concur with neo-
liberals. There is significant evidence that bilateral economic relations lead to peace. 
Firstly, the U.S. regarding the ROK-Japan problems chose an economic solution not 
an institution. American-ROK-Japan security needs were harmonious due to the 
Korean War, which highlighted the communist threats from the Soviets and PRC and 
the danger of the South Korea becoming an outpost. By 1961, these needs had three 
common economic interests: (1) the U.S. wanted to entrust their economic burdens in 
the ROK to Japan who was expected to perform a leadership role in Asia, (2) Park‟s 
regime wanted to be rehabilitated with Japanese support, and (3) Japan expected new 
opportunities for a new market and cheap labor in the ROK. Secondly, the U.S. 
installed direct bilateral relations with the ROK and Japan, which propelled U.S. to 
care about the ROK and Japan‟s situation and to take responsibility for it. 
Furthermore, the U.S. supported the ROK through military and economic aid to 
whatever extent was needed, not considering the Japanese position, not only because 
the three countries did not found a regional multilateral organization but also because 
the U.S. was more responsible for, and cared about, the ROK under a bilateral 
structure.  
Thirdly and more importantly, the U.S. strengthened bilateral economic 
relations between the ROK and Japan. In the early 1960s, American influence 
declined in the ROK and the decision was made to withdraw from ROK, for four 
reasons: (1) the U.S. lost its position as the only superpower not only because of the 
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achievement of the Russian strategic parity, but also because of nuclear development 
of China and France (2) American allies in Europe and Asia as a result of economic 
development and nationalistic concerns began to take a different outlook to the U.S. 
(3) American inability in the Vietnam conflict, and (4) the Cuban missile crisis 
changed American attitude toward the Soviets, commencing selective bilateral 
relations in terms of nuclear non-proliferation, trade and cultural exchange. 
Reinforcing bilateral economic relations between ROK and Japan spurred both to 
have closer cooperation. Even though it is hard to evaluate the exact function of 
Japanese capital and technology in the ROK‟s economic growth, it is certain that 
they played a significant role. Japanese economic aid, technology transfer, trade, 
capital investment and loans enabled ROK to achieve rapid economic growth and 
rehabilitation, and to reaffirm a shared strategic outlook. Thus, the historically wary 
relations between the ROK and Japan showed signs of improvement which could 
feasibly be enhanced further with dialogue on the normalization in 1965. 
It may be that the conflict between Turkey and Greece is more about real 
strategic and economic matter, such as the Aegean and Cyprus, whereas the conflict 
between ROK and Japan is more about history, psychology and prestige. For 
instance, Turco-Bulgarian relations were similar: Bulgarian psychology was anti-
Turkish and anti-Ottoman. But, apart from the minority issue, there was hardly 
anything that separated the two countries. And, when Bulgaria realized that Turkey 
had no intention to use that minority against the territorial integrity of Bulgaria, the 
bilateral relation improved quickly in the 1990s, resulting in Bulgaria‟s membership 
of NATO through Turkish support. 
In conclusion, this thesis contributes to the international relations literature 
with two main findings: (1) the economic solution was more effective than the 
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NATO solution for conflict, and (2) the formation of bilateral relations contributed to 
the removal of historical enmity and the establishment of peace instead of 
multilateralism. Thus, when comparing both cases it makes sense that Turkish-Greek 
relations based on institutionalism lost its claims about the peace-causing effects of 
institutions, whereas South Korea-Japan relations reached various affinities and trust, 
and after all, normalization of relations. Therefore, I conclude that instead of a 
multilateral institution, which has only a minimal effect on peace as a short term goal 
for deterrent, bilateral economic interdependence makes a contribution to the 
development of peaceful relations as a long term goal. Given that history cannot be 
rewritten, what can be written from now on should be the pages of the future for 
peace by using economic interdependence. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
ROK-JAPAN ECONOMIC TREATIES AND RELATED 
AGREEMENTS, 1967-1991 
 
 
 
1967-71 
Content: Civil Aviation (1967) 
 Technical assistance(1967) 
 Trademarks(1968) 
 Tax exemption (1969) 
 Double taxation (1970) 
 Agriculture/fishery (1971, ￥7.2 billion loan) 
 Small/medium firms (1971, ￥10.8 billion loan) 
 Kumoh technical training center (1971, ￥130 million grant)a 
 Kumoh technical training school (￥390 million loan) 
 Rail/subway construction (1971, ￥27.2 billion loan) 
Aggregate total: 12 
Adjusted total: 10 
1972-74 
Content: Telecommunications (1973, ￥6.2 billion loan) 
 Export-industry promotion (1973, ￥15.4 billion loan) 
 Kumoh technical training center (1974, ￥563 million grant) 
 Agricultural technological cooperation (1974) 
 Rural development (dam) (1974, ￥19.4 billion loan) 
 Laboratory equipment (1974, ￥500 million grant) 
Aggregate total: 9 
Adjusted total: 6 
1975-79 
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Content: Pukpyong port (1975, ￥12.4 billion loan) 
 Seoul National University laboratory equipment (1975) 
 Taejon training institute (1976) 
 Seoul National University laboratory equipment (1976,  ￥1 
billion grant) 
 Telecommunications development (1976, ￥6.6 billion loan) 
 Agricultural development (1977, ￥12.6 billion loan) 
 Electricity transmission lines (1977, ￥6 billion loan) 
 Wheat and barley research (1977, ￥100 million grant) 
 Medical equipment (1977, ￥600 million grant) 
 Continental shelf (1978) 
 Continental shelf II (1978) 
 Medical equipment (1978, ￥440 million grant) 
 Agricultural and medical equipment (1978, ￥14 billion loan) 
 Language laboratory equipment (1979, ￥15 million grant) 
Aggregate total: 16 
Adjusted total: 15 
1980-88
b
 
Content: Sewage treatment (1980, ￥19 billion loan) 
 Hospital and educational facilities (1981, ￥19 billion loan) 
 Development loan (1983, ￥45 billion loan) 
 Development loan (1984, ￥49.5 billion loan)  
 Double taxation (1985) 
 Development loan (1985, ￥54.4 billion loan) 
 Scientific and technological cooperation (1985) 
 Development loan (1987, ￥44.6 billion loan) 
 Development loan (1988, ￥27.2 billion loan) 
Aggregate total: 12 
Adjusted total: 9 
1989-91 
Content: Development loan (1989, ￥7.6 billion loan) 
 Maritime science/research (1990) 
 Nuclear energy (1990) 
 Development loan (1990, ￥99.5 billion loan)  
 Development loan (1985, ￥54.4 billion loan) 
Aggregate total: 6 
Adjusted total: 4 
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SOURCE: Compiled from MOFA, Taehan min‟guk choyakjip: yangja choyak 
(Bilateral treaties and agreements of the Republic of Korea), government publication 
No. 17000-25100-17-9459, vols. 2-14 (Seoul: Republic of Korea, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, International Treaties Division, 1962-91) quoted in Victor D. Cha, 
Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 237-238 
 
NOTE: Figures do not include 1965 normalization treaty or related 
agreements/amendments. Enumerated agreements are those listed under the adjusted 
total. Adjusted totals were calculated by subtraction from aggregate totals those 
agreements that were amendments or revisions of earlier agreements. 
a Agreement signed in 1972 but negotiated during the 1967-71 period. 
b Development loan agreements for 1983-87 are annual installments of the 
original 1983 $4 billion loan agreement. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
LETTER FROM THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE DULLES TO 
THE GREEK PRIME MINISTER PAPAGOS, SEPTEMBER 18, 
1955. 
 
 
 
I have followed with concern the dangerous deteriorations of Greek-Turkish 
relations caused by the Cyprus question. Regardless of the causes of the 
disagreement, which are complex and numerous, I believe that the unity of the North 
Atlantic community, which is the basis of our common security, must be restored 
without delay. 
Since the time, almost a decade ago, when Communist expansion first posed 
a serious threat to the free world, the close and friendly cooperation of Greece and 
Turkey has proved a powerful deterrent to Communist ambitions in the eastern 
Mediterranean. In Korea, Turkish and Greek troops fought valiantly, side by side, to 
repel the Communist aggressors.  
I cannot believe that in the face of this record of common achievement, any 
problem will long disrupt the course of Greek-Turkish friendship. Nor can I believe 
that the unhappy events of the past two weeks will reverse policies of cooperation 
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which were initiated twenty-five year ago under the far-sighted leadership of 
Eleftherios Venizelos and Kemal Ataturk.  
Since 1947 the United States has made very considerable efforts to assist 
Greece and Turkey to maintain their freedom and to achieve greater social and 
economic progress. We have extended this assistance - and extend it now – because 
we believe that the partnership of Greece and Turkey constitutes a strong bulwark of 
the free world in a critical area. 
If that bulwark should be materially weakened, the consequences could be 
grave indeed. I urge you therefore to make every effort to assure that the 
effectiveness of your partnership is not impaired by present disagreements.  
I am confident that the spirit of close cooperation that Greece and Turkey 
have so often demonstrated in the past as fellow members of the United Nations, the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Balkan Alliance will enable you to 
transcend immediate differences in the interests of free world unity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Text reprinted from Paul E. Zinner, ed., Documents on American Foreign 
Relations: 1955 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1956), p. 167. The text of 
the letter from the secretary of state to the prime minister of Turkey (Menderes) is 
identical this letter, except that the two countries are named in reverse order in 
quoted Monteagle Stearns, Entangled Alliances U.S. Policy toward Greece, Turkey, 
and Cyprus (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1992), pp. 154-155. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO THE 
TURKISH PRIME MINISTER İNÖ NÜ , JUNE 5, 1964 
 
 
 
Dear Mr. Prime Minister, 
I am gravely concerned by the information which I have had through 
Ambassador Hare from you and your Foreign Minister that the Turkish Government 
is contemplating a decision to intervene by military force to occupy a portion of 
Cyprus. I wish to emphasize, in the fullest friendship and frankness, that I do not 
consider that such a course of action by Turkey, fraught with such far reaching 
consequences, is consistent with the commitment of your government to consult fully 
in advance with the United States. Ambassador Hare has indicated that you 
postponed your decision for a few hours in order to obtain my views. I put to you 
personally whether you really believe that it is appropriate for your government, in 
effect, to present an ultimatum to an ally who has the United States for Turkey. I 
must, therefore, first urge you to accept the responsibility for complete consultation 
with the United States before any such action is taken. 
It is my impression that you believe that such intervention by Turkey is 
permissible under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960. I must call your 
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attention, however, to our understanding that the proposed intervention by Turkey 
would be for the purpose of supporting an attempt by Turkish Cypriot leaders to 
partition the island, a solution which is specifically excluded by the Treaty of 
Guarantee. Further, that treaty requires consultation among the guarantor powers. It 
is the view of the United States that the possibilities of such consultation have by no 
means been exhausted in this situation and that, therefore, the reservation of the right 
to take unilateral action is not yet applicable. 
I must call to your attention also, Mr. Prime Minister, the obligations of 
NATO. There can be no question in your mind that a Turkish intervention in Cyprus 
would lead to a military engagement between Turkish and Greek forces. Secretary of 
State Rusk declared at a recent meeting of the ministerial council of NATO in The 
Hague that war between Turkey and Greece must be considered as “literally 
unthinkable.” Adhesion to NATO, in its very essence, means that NATO countries 
will not wage war on each other. Germany and France have buried centuries of 
animosity and hostility in becoming NATO allies; nothing less can be expected from 
Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could 
lead to direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your 
NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to 
protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in 
Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies. 
Further, Mr. Prime Minister, I am concerned about the obligations of Turkey 
as a member of the United Nations. The United Nations has provided forces on the 
island to keep the peace. Their task has been difficult but, during the past several 
weeks, they have been progressively successful in reducing the incidents of violence 
on that island. The United Nations Mediator has not yet completed his work. I have 
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no doubt that the general membership of the United Nations would react in the 
strongest terms to unilateral action by Turkey which would defy the efforts of the 
United Nations and destroy any prospect that the United Nations could assist in 
obtaining a reasonable and peaceful settlement of this difficult problem.  
I wish also, Mr. Prime Minister, to call your attention to the bilateral 
agreement between the United States and Turkey in the field of the military 
assistance. Under Article IV of the agreement with Turkey of July 1947, your 
government is required to obtain United States consent for the use of military 
assistance for purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished. 
Your government has on several occasions acknowledged to the United States that 
you fully understand this condition. I must tell you in all candor that the United 
States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a 
Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances.  
Moving to the practical results of the contemplated Turkish move, I feel 
obligated to call to your attention in the most friendly fashion the fact that such a 
Turkish move could lead to the slaughter of tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots on 
the island of Cyprus. Such as action on your part would unleash the furies and there 
is no way by which military action on your part could be sufficiently effective to 
prevent wholesale destruction of many of those whom you are trying to protect. The 
presence of United Nations forces could not prevent such a catastrophe. 
You may consider that what I have said is much too severe and that we are 
disregardful of Turkish interests in the Cyprus situation. I should like to assure you 
that this is not the case. We have exerted ourselves both publicly and privately to 
assure the safety of Turkish Cypriots and to insist that a final solution of the Cyprus 
problems should rest upon the consent of the parties most directly concerned. It is 
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possible that you feel in Ankara that the United States has not been sufficiently 
active in your behalf. But surely you know that our policy has caused the liveliest 
resentment in Athens (where demonstrations have been aimed against us) and has led 
to a basic alienation between the United States and Archbishop Makarios. As I said 
to your Foreign Minister in our conversation just a few weeks ago, we value very 
highly our relations with Turkey. We have considered you as a great ally with 
fundamental common interests. Your security and prosperity have been a deep 
concern of the American people and we have expressed that concern in the most 
practical terms. You and we have fought together to resist the ambitions of the 
communist world revolution. This solidarity has meant a great deal to us and I would 
hope that it means a great deal to your government and to your people. We have no 
intention of lending any support to any solution of Cyprus which endangers the 
Turkish Cypriot community. We have not been able to find a final solution because 
this is, admittedly, one of the most complex problems on earth. But I wish to assure 
you that we have been deeply concerned about the interests of Turkey and of the 
Turkish Cypriots and will remain so. 
Finally, Mr. Prime Minister, I must tell you that you have posed the gravest 
issues of war and peace. These are issues which go far beyond the bilateral relations 
between Turkey and the United States. They not only will certainly involve war 
between Turkey and Greece but could involve wider hostilities because of the 
unpredictable consequences which a unilateral intervention in Cyprus could produce. 
You have your responsibilities as chief of the government of Turkey; I also have 
mine as President of the United States. I must, therefore, inform you in the deepest 
friendship that unless I can have your assurance that you will not take such action 
without further and fullest consultation I cannot accept your injunction to 
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Ambassador Hare of secrecy and must immediately ask for emergency meetings of 
the NATO Council and of the United Nations Security Council. 
I wish it were possible for us to have a personal discussion of this situation. 
Unfortunately, because of the special circumstances of our present constitutional 
position, I am not able to leave the United States. If you could come here for a full 
discussion I would welcome it. I do feel that you and I carry a very heavy 
responsibility for the general peace and for the possibilities of a sane and peaceful 
resolution of the Cyprus problem. I ask you, therefore, to delay any decisions which 
you and your colleagues might have in mind until you and I have had the fullest and 
frankest consultation. 
Sincerely, 
 
LYNDON B. JOHNSON 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Monteagle Stearns, Entangled Alliances U.S. Policy toward Greece, Turkey, 
and Cyprus (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1992), pp. 156-159. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
 
THE SUMMARY TEXT OF KOREAN PROPERTY CLAIMS  
 
 
 
1. About 250 million grams of gold bullion and some 67 million grams of 
silver bullion that Japan removed to Japan through the Bank of Chosen [Korea] 
during the period 1909-1945. 
2. Various postal savings, insurance, and pension funds, etc., that the 
Japanese Government-General of Korea owed to Korean nationals as of August 9, 
1945. 
3. The bank deposits drawn by Japanese nationals from banks in Korea and 
monies transferred or remitted from Korea to Japan since August 9, 1945. 
4. Properties of the Tokyo office of the Government-General of Korea, the 
properties in Japan possessed by any legal corporation that had its main office in 
Korea, and various assets held in Japan by the banks with their main office in Korea 
as of August 9, 1945. 
5. Claims for negotiable notes, Japanese currencies, unpaid salaries, pensions 
and compensations (of the conscripted Korean workers), dividends, etc., that the 
Japanese Government and Japanese nationals owed to Koreans. 
6. 668 vessels that Japan removed from Korean harbors after August 9, 1945. 
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7. Art objects that Japan removed from Korea during its rule. 
 
Source: Kwan Bong Kim, The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of the 
Korean Political System (New York, Washington, London: Praeger Publishers, 
1971), pp. 54-55. 
